Locke on Knowledge

How Berkeley's Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree

“…Locke similarly follows Descartes and Port‐Royal in dismissing the importance of the highly abstract principles known as ‘maxims’ or ‘axioms’ and of the syllogistic forms (Jolley, , pp. 170–175; Newman, , pp. 326–327).…”

Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

“…First, one might wonder whether I have actually succeeded in showing that intuitive knowledge of our own ideas is consistent with Locke's definition of knowledge. For example, Newman (, ) argues that knowledge, for Locke, consists only in a perception of an agreement between two ideas. Rickless (, p. 86) cites the following passage from IV.i.5 as the most persuasive of the same claim, since it seems to say that there is ‘no room’ for any kind of agreement that is not between two ideas: ‘There could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our Ideas , and find out the Agreement or Disagreement, they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.’ I don't think we have to see the interpretation I have offered as conflicting with these passages.…”

“…In II.xxxiii.19, we find, ‘… our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions’; in the Correspondence with Stillingfleet (Locke, , iv: 357), he says, ‘Everything which we either know or believe, is some proposition,’ and ‘… certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, as expressed in any proposition’ (iv: 118). In addition, in the IV.v.1 definition of truth, Locke is clear that the ‘joining or separating of Signs’ whose agreement or disagreement constitutes truth ‘is what by another name, we call Proposition.’ For some of the secondary literature espousing this view see, for example, Ruth Mattern ( [1998]), David Soles (), Lex Newman, (, ), Samuel C. Rickless (), and Jennifer Nagel (in press) for interpretations of Locke's theory of knowledge and especially of sensitive knowledge that emphasize the propositional nature of knowledge.…”

“…For example, Gibson (), Aaron (), Mabbott (), and Ayers () mention knowledge of the agreement of identity, but dismiss it as ‘trifling.’ Yolton () and Jolley () don't mention it at all. One exception is Lex Newman (, p. 328, note 18) who treats the issue briefly in a footnote. Without going into all the details, Newman suggests that knowing an idea, say red , involves the perception of two separate agreements both utilizing abstract ideas (one agreement includes an abstract idea of red, the other an abstract idea of perception).…”

“…Ott (, pp. 45–48), Newman (, p. 321), and van der Schaar (, p. 340) argue against this interpretation, defending a ‘proto‐Fregean’ account in order to avoid some of these difficulties. Marušić (, pp.…”