According to George Berkeley, there is fundamentally nothing in the world but minds and their ideas. Ideas are understood as pure phenomenal ‘feels’ which are momentarily had by a single perceiver, then vanish. Surprisingly, Berkeley tries to sell this idealistic philosophical system as a defense of common sense and an aid to science. However, both common sense and Newtonian science take the perceived world to be highly structured in a way that Berkeley’s system does not appear to allow. This book argues that Berkeley’s solution to this problem lies in his innovative philosophy of language. The solution works at two levels. At the first level, it is by means of our conventions for the use of physical object talk that we impose structure on the world. At a deeper level, the orderliness of the world is explained by the fact that, according to Berkeley, the world itself is a discourse ‘spoken’ by God—the world is literally an object of linguistic interpretation. The structure that our physical object talk—in common sense and in Newtonian physics—aims to capture is the grammatical structure of this divine discourse. This approach yields surprising consequences for some of the most discussed issues in Berkeley’s metaphysics. Most notably, it is argued that, in Berkeley’s view, physical objects are neither ideas nor collections of ideas. Rather, physical objects, like forces, are mere quasi-entities brought into being by our linguistic practices.
An omnipotent being would be a being whose power was unlimited. The power of human beings is limited in two distinct ways: we are limited with respect to our freedom of will, and we are limited in our ability to execute what we have willed. These two distinct sources of limitation suggest a simple definition of omnipotence: an omnipotent being is one that has both perfect freedom of will and perfect efficacy of will. In this article we further explicate this definition and show that it escapes the standard objections to divine omnipotence.
According to common sense, some but not all collections of objects are unified into larger wholes. For instance, a certain collection of pieces composes a person’s desk, but there is no object composed of that person’s left ear and the Eiffel Tower. Mereological idealism is the view that our conceptualizing activity is responsible for this unification: a collection of objects composes a whole if and only if those objects are co-apprehended by some mind under some concept. This chapter develops this view in detail and defends it against objections. Additionally, the chapter argues that mereological idealism is able to solve certain well-known problems faced by other theories of composition: the vagueness problem, the causal exclusion problem, and the problem of alternative conceptual schemes.
George Berkeley's linguistic account of sense perception is one of the most central tenets of his philosophy. It is intended as a solution to a wide range of critical issues in both metaphysics and theology. However, it is not clear from Berkeley's writings just how this ‘universal language of the Author of Nature’ is to be interpreted. This paper discusses the nature of the theory of sense perception as language, together with its metaphysical and theological motivations, then proceeds to develop an account of the semantics of the perceptual language, using Berkeley's theory of reference for human language as a guide.
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