Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

Abstract

Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein.

Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

“…Owen (1999) and Weinberg (2015 and 2016) hold this view. According to Weinberg, ‘distinguishing an idea is no more than to perceive it, which results in knowing it’ (2015, 353). See also Ayers (1991), Loeb (1981), and Newman (2007) for discussions about what it means to know our ideas.…”

“…So that insofar as I perceive my idea and am able to distinguish it from different ideas, this constitutes a kind of knowledge. Owen (1999) and Weinberg (2015 and 2016) hold this view. According to Weinberg, ‘distinguishing an idea is no more than to perceive it, which results in knowing it’ (2015, 353).…”