"Lives Worth Living:" Theorizing Moral Status and Expressions of Human Life

Abstract

<p>A growing body of work in feminist philosophy of disability, in particular, and philosophy of cognitive disability, more generally, demonstrates the discursive constitution of norms of intelligence and cognitive ability in order to undermine both the false assumptions about human ability and the gendered and racialized norms of rationality, independence, and competence that inform philosophical and bioethical theories about moral status. Many of these philosophical accounts of disability seem designed to—implicitly or explicitly—prove that, given some newly-valued norms,  certain persons do indeed have these capabilities, rather than to transform the social conditions that create such demarcations in the first place. In this paper, I argue that feminist philosophy of disability and moral philosophy more broadly would benefit if they were to consider the social conditions of possibility in which these qualifications for moral status arise, rather than continue to focus on the qualifications themselves. In order to argue in this way, I consider how assessments of moral status and human life simultaneously foreclose possible expressions of "lives worth living." I suggest, furthermore, that feminist philosophers of disability in particular and feminist philosophers in general would benefit if they were to consider the risks that this normative theorizing involves. In turn, I propose a way in which feminist philosophers ought to orient themselves in order to create the conditions of possibility for the emergence of divergent expressions of human well-being and moral potential. </p><p>Keywords: personhood; intellectual disability; social justice; normative violence; feminist philosophy</p>

“I Am Human Too!” ‘Probeerruimte’ as Liminal Spaces in Search of Recognition

“…For many within disability studies, particularly intellectual disability studies, contestation about the state of being human is related to human rights and specifically citizenship (Cockburn, 2007;Curtice, 2010;Frawley & Bigby, 2011;Jinnah, 2006;Meininger, 2013;Mertens, Sullivan, & Stace, 2006, cited in Laliberte Rudman, 2014Redley & Weinberg, 2007;Siebers, 2007;Taylor, 2013). Inherent to this line of thought is the idea that being 'awarded' citizenship status is one of the ultimate confirmations of being considered human.…”

“…Inherent to this line of thought is the idea that being 'awarded' citizenship status is one of the ultimate confirmations of being considered human. Some discourse, in this arena, explores the extent to which moral personhood and a 'life worth living' can be attributed to people with learning difficulties (Taylor, 2013). Who and what determines a 'life worth living'?…”

The DisHuman child

“…Not surprisingly, given the conflation of disability and monstrosity, disability, too, is often invoked in discussions of the human (Kittay & Carlson, 2010). The words 'person' and 'human' are used interchangeably but being born human is not enough for an individual to achieve the status of person (Taylor, 2013). This matters, because being seen as 'human but not quite', means that the associated human entitlements and protections may also be denied (Taylor, 2013).…”

“…The words 'person' and 'human' are used interchangeably but being born human is not enough for an individual to achieve the status of person (Taylor, 2013). This matters, because being seen as 'human but not quite', means that the associated human entitlements and protections may also be denied (Taylor, 2013). Eva Feder Kittay (2011) describes the ways in which those with 'severe cognitive impairments' have often been consigned to the category of 'human nonpersons' excluded from discussions about social justice because they are deemed to lack (narrowly defined conceptions of) 'capacity' and 'autonomy'.…”

Feminist Approaches to Cognitive Disability

“…See the exchange between Eva Kittay, Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer in Kittay and Carlson, 2010; Kittay 2007 and 2010. See also Carlson, ; Taylor, ; Wong, .…”