2016
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12350
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Feminist Approaches to Cognitive Disability

Abstract: This essay explores various philosophical approaches to cognitive disability within feminist philosophy. In doing so, it addresses three broad questions: What positive contributions can feminist philosophy make to the philosophy of cognitive disability? How have feminist philosophers critiqued the presence and absence of cognitive disability in philosophy? And what challenges does cognitive disability pose to feminist philosophy itself? The essay begins with definitions and models of disability and then turns … Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 62 publications
(76 reference statements)
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“…In philosophy broadly, intellectual disability has been largely erased or treated as a marginal case through which to explore questions of moral status and personhood (Carlson 2016;Wasserman et al 2017). Licia Carlson has written extensively about the problematic use of intellectual disability as a marginal case in philosophy, noting that such arguments rarely invoke or resemble the actual lives of people labeled with intellectual disabilities (Carlson 2016;.…”
Section: Defining Intellectual Disability and Situating It In Philosophymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In philosophy broadly, intellectual disability has been largely erased or treated as a marginal case through which to explore questions of moral status and personhood (Carlson 2016;Wasserman et al 2017). Licia Carlson has written extensively about the problematic use of intellectual disability as a marginal case in philosophy, noting that such arguments rarely invoke or resemble the actual lives of people labeled with intellectual disabilities (Carlson 2016;.…”
Section: Defining Intellectual Disability and Situating It In Philosophymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In philosophy broadly, intellectual disability has been largely erased or treated as a marginal case through which to explore questions of moral status and personhood (Carlson 2016; Wasserman et al 2017). Licia Carlson has written extensively about the problematic use of intellectual disability as a marginal case in philosophy, noting that such arguments rarely invoke or resemble the actual lives of people labeled with intellectual disabilities (Carlson 2016; 2021). Such moral debates, however divorced they are from the lived experience of intellectual disability, stand to bear critically on those lives, as “the humanity of people with intellectual disabilities is held suspect” (Taylor 2013, 5).…”
Section: Defining Intellectual Disability and Situating It In Philosophymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, it has been suggested that autism, and some 'symptoms' of psychosis such as voice hearing, should not be regarded as diseases, but as examples of 'neurodiversity' (Mcgee 2012;Runswick-Cole 2014). By contrast, although people in general live many decades before suffering the impairments associated with their AD risk, by comparison to the body of research and advocacy that exists in the autism community, and, notwithstanding some notable analyses (Carlson 2016;Shakespeare, Zeilig, and Mittler 2019) the same kinds of argument in favor of reframing the condition as a set of valued differences rather than a disorder are largely absent.…”
Section: Disease and Neurodiversitymentioning
confidence: 99%