Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios

Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

“…So a plausible epistemic condition on robustness is not satisfied in this example. Widerker (2006) has developed a challenge to the Tax Evasion argument in which he applies the distinction between non-derivative and derivative responsibility to the Further Thoughts about a Frankfurt-style Argument example, claiming that non-derivative moral responsibility is subject to a principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). 3 Widerker argues that in the example Joe is only derivatively blameworthy for his decision to evade taxes:…”

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION1

“…Widerker (2006) proposes a challenge to the Tax Evasion argument in which he applies the distinction between non‐derivative and derivative responsibility to the example, claiming that non‐derivative moral responsibility is subject to a principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Specifically, Widerker argues that in Tax Evasion Joe is only derivatively blameworthy for his decision to evade taxes:…”

“…If he is morally responsible for the assault, it is only derivatively so-derivative, in particular, on his being non-derivatively morally responsible for deciding to get drunk, and his foreseeing that when he is drunk he is likely to be abusive (Ginet 2000). Widerker (2006) proposes a challenge to the Tax Evasion argument in which he applies the distinction between non-derivative and derivative responsibility to the example, claiming that non-derivative moral responsibility is subject to a principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Specifically, Widerker argues that in Tax Evasion Joe is only derivatively blameworthy for his decision to evade taxes:…”

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities

“…In Robb and Mele's FSC, it is the difference between a choice that results from the agent's indeterministic brain processes, and a choice that occurs instead because of an extraneous deterministic process, that can only be stopped by the indeterministic process Robb 1998, 2003). In Widerker's version, it is the difference between an agent choosing wrongdoing irrespective of a brain malfunction which ensures that it is impossible for him to arrive at a blameless decision, and the agent choosing the wrongdoing only because this brain malfunction means it is impossible for him to arrive at a blameless decision (Widerker 2006(Widerker , 2009. And of course, there may be different versions with alternatives that are differentiated in other ways.…”

“…In this category, we have examples such as those provided by Hunt (2000), Stump (1999aStump ( , b, 2003, Widerker (2006), Fischer (1999, 2007 and Mele (1998, 2003). I do not have the space to discuss all of these formulations or others in the literature.…”