Les relations Brésil/Iran et la question du nucléaire

Abstract

Nouvelle.Il est aussiMembre du Collège doctoral franco-brésilien.Le président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad s'est rendu au Brésil en novembre 2009, créant une grande polémique dans le pays. Les communautés juive et homosexuelle ainsi que les organisations luttant pour les droits de l'homme ont alors dénoncé la venue d'un président si contesté, connu pour sa rhétorique provocatrice. Cela a également soulevé de nombreuses critiques de la part des puissances occidentales redoutant la politique nucléaire iranienne, les Etats-Unis en tête. Mais les ambitions brésiliennes de convertir le pays en un acteur d'importance mondiale souhaitant un siége de membre permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, passent aussi par le fait de traiter des grandes affaires mondiales de sécurité collective dont la question du nucléaire iranien fait partie (tout comme le conflit israélo-palestinien). La position brésilienne sur cette question est particulièrement intéressante puisqu'on ne peut s'empêcher de faire un parallèle entre le programme nucléaire iranien et celui du Brésil qui, en son temps, avait également soulevé les suspicions de la part des grandes puissances.Ces dernières années, un rapprochement s'est opéré de fait entre Brésiliens et Iraniens, à la fois pour des questions économiques de diversification des marchés sur la base des nouvelles relations SudSud, mais également sur le plan diplomatique dans un objectif commun de promouvoir un monde multipolaire. Ce rapprochement n'est pas sans conséquence pour les Brésiliens, qui ont opté pour une stratégie diplomatique volontariste particulièrement risquée. Le développement d'une relation Sud-Sud Les relations diplomatiques entre deux puissances régionales

Brazil, the United States and the Tehran Declaration

“…Besides Brazil's intentions to contribute towards stability, the country also wanted to display its influence as a crafty diplomatic negotiator in world affairs (Chatin 2016) because of its pursuit of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat and its elite's ambitions to play a role in major global issues (Jesus 2011;Muxagato 2010). Brazil's role 19 in nuclear disarmament initiatives has been an asset mainly because the country displays three strong means to achieving 15 The United States, Russia, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 16 In the words of the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya Amano (pers.…”

“…Brazil is known as an active member of fora on nuclear disarmament such as the Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Brazil's presence in these platforms has added to its reputation as a respected player in the field of nuclear disarmament initiatives, which dates back to the 1960s when Brazil was the first country to advocate a nuclear-free zone in Latin America (Rublee 2010, Muxagato 2010. When it comes to Brazil's role regarding a nuclear-free world, its capacity to reach out to so-called problematic nations in the field of nuclear security is considered an asset, since Brazil's own historical background in nuclear energy development is an example of how a country can develop nuclear capability for civilian use without being tempted to explore its military side.…”

“…The use of nuclear technology in many aspects of civilian life in the modern days -energy output or in medical research for instance -is essential to any nation. Brazil's role as a mediator in this issue can also be seen through the lenses of Brazilian interests in improving its relations with the Republic of Iran, not only concerning commercial ties but also political affairs (Muxagato 2010). One last asset underpinning Brazil's role in disarmament initiatives is its constitution, which defends a country free from any pursuit of nuclear technology for military purposes (Rublee 2010).…”

“…Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that by discrediting the Tehran Declaration, the US was not only stopping Iran from acting independently regarding its nuclear program, but also presenting its stance concerning the involvement of new powers in complex global issues (Leverett 2013). Although the rejection by the US and its allies of Brazil's efforts in the Tehran Declaration is seen as Brazil's inability to "graduate" as an emerging country with an active voice on the world stage (Milani et al 2017), it is more reasonable to believe that this was not the case, and that the American attitude was more about its unwillingness to accept middle powers as active negotiators in high politics (Jesus 2011;Muxagato 2010…”