2009
DOI: 10.1109/tvt.2008.2002917
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Learning to Compete for Resources in Wireless Stochastic Games

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Cited by 88 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…In [16], Huang et al proposed single-sided spectrum auction mechanisms for power allocation among secondary users subject to an interference temperature constraint at a single measurement point. The behavior of participants in spectrum auctions was studied in [17] for a single-sided spectrum auction and in [18] for a double-sided spectrum auction. In [19], Sengupta and Chatterjee proposed a knapsack auction in which the spectrum auction was modeled as a knapsack problem and both first-price and secondprice mechanisms were considered in their auction design.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [16], Huang et al proposed single-sided spectrum auction mechanisms for power allocation among secondary users subject to an interference temperature constraint at a single measurement point. The behavior of participants in spectrum auctions was studied in [17] for a single-sided spectrum auction and in [18] for a double-sided spectrum auction. In [19], Sengupta and Chatterjee proposed a knapsack auction in which the spectrum auction was modeled as a knapsack problem and both first-price and secondprice mechanisms were considered in their auction design.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two types of RRM can be distinguished as static RRM [1][2][3][4] and dynamic RRM [2,[5][6][7][8][9][10]. This classification is based on whether the resource is managed dynamically.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, it is essential to have a spectrum sharing scheme that defines an arbitration strategy between the SUs. While several studies have focused on devising efficient spectrum sharing mechanisms over resource-constrained CRNs, [10][11][12] it is interesting that most of the proposed mechanisms are problem-specific and lack generality. For example, a certain mechanism could be designed to deal with a certain limited resource, completely overlooking other types of resources that can arise dynamically in the network.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%