Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

Roth, Alvin E.; Erev, Ido

doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x

Cited by 1,335 publications

(868 citation statements)

References 33 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…3 This differentiates our model from learning models [e. g., Roth and Erev 1995] that relax the rationality assumption but maintain the assumption that all players are only interested in their own material payoff. The issue of learning is further discussed in Section VII below.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

1998

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There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

1998

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“…Apart from reinforcement learning, these approaches are inapplicable to the MSS because of the impoverished information that is available to MSS players. Simple reinforcement learning theories (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003;Erev & Roth, 1998;Feltovich, 2000;Roth & Erev, 1995), on the other hand, are closely related to WSLS, and the most relevant forms of reinforcement learning will be revisited in Section 6.4.…”

Section: Mss Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning to cooperate without awareness in multiplayer minimal social situations

Colman¹,

Pulford²,

Omtzigt³

et al. 2010

Cognitive Psychology

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Experimental and Monte Carlo methods were used to test theoretical predictions about adaptive learning of cooperative responses without awareness in minimal social situations-games in which the payoffs to players depend not on their own actions but exclusively on the actions of other group members. In Experiment 1, learning occurred slowly over 200 rounds in a dyadic minimal social situation but not in multiplayer groups. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, learning occurred rarely in multiplayer groups, even when players were informed that they were interacting strategically and were allowed to communicate with one another but were not aware of the game's payoff structure. Monte Carlo simulation suggested that players approach minimal social situations using a noisy version of the win-stay, lose-shift decision rule, deviating from the deterministic rule less frequently after rewarding than unrewarding rounds.

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“…Fictive learning simply refers to adjustment of strategy likelihoods from model-based knowledge of the payoffs that would have been earned from a strategy 15 This limit of reinforcement learning has been known for many years. It produces especially poor results in many-person games in which only one person earns a reward (e.g., "market games" [21]; LUPI lottery games [22]; and auctions). Two interesting generalizations which sometimes fit actual learning better are the inclusion of an aspiration level, and/or spreading reinforcement from one strategy to neighboring strategies.…”

Section: Learning and Anxietymentioning

confidence: 99%

Anxiety and Learning in Dynamic and Static Clock Game Experiments

2010

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In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fundamental. The price crashes to the fundamental when K of N agents have decided to sell. If selling decisions are private, bubbles can be sustained because people delay selling, after receiving signals, knowing that others will delay too. Our results replicate the main features of the one previous experimental study of clock game (in two subject pools): Selling delays are shorter than predicted, but converge toward equilibrium predictions over repeated trials. We also find that delays are shorter in a dynamic game in which selling decisions unfold over time, compared to a static equivalent in which subjects precommit to selling decisions. A model of learning with growing anxiety after signal arrival can reproduce the empirical observations of shorter-than-predicted delay, smaller delay after later signal arrival, and shorter delays in dynamic games.

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Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

Cited by 1,335 publications

References 33 publications

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Learning to cooperate without awareness in multiplayer minimal social situations

Anxiety and Learning in Dynamic and Static Clock Game Experiments

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