2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.003
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Learning to cooperate without awareness in multiplayer minimal social situations

Abstract: Experimental and Monte Carlo methods were used to test theoretical predictions about adaptive learning of cooperative responses without awareness in minimal social situations-games in which the payoffs to players depend not on their own actions but exclusively on the actions of other group members. In Experiment 1, learning occurred slowly over 200 rounds in a dyadic minimal social situation but not in multiplayer groups. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, learning occurred rarely in multiplayer groups, even when pla… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…This contrasts with variants of the WSLS rule that require the learner to always shift to a new hypothesis (see Colman et al, 2010). While such an algorithm would behave the same as our algorithm in a deterministic setting if it was appropriately augmented to sample from the posterior on switching, it would behave differently in a stochastic setting.…”
Section: ! 22!mentioning
confidence: 53%
“…This contrasts with variants of the WSLS rule that require the learner to always shift to a new hypothesis (see Colman et al, 2010). While such an algorithm would behave the same as our algorithm in a deterministic setting if it was appropriately augmented to sample from the posterior on switching, it would behave differently in a stochastic setting.…”
Section: ! 22!mentioning
confidence: 53%
“…But there are also advantages in mistakenly failing to attribute strategic reasoning capabilities to other people. Colman, Pulford, Omtzigt, and al-Nowaihi (2011) introduced a game in which players had an option to award payoffs to each other costlessly. The experiment’s manipulation was an information condition: not all subjects were aware that their decisions were influencing each other’s payoffs, or even that others were playing the game.…”
Section: Success In Misattributing Both Strategic Agenthood and Thementioning
confidence: 99%
“…To these researchers, any academic outcome depends primarily on what one thinks and feels about oneself. This serves as a morale booster to learn (Colman et al, 2010); and a motivational impetus for positive achievement (Illeris, 2004).…”
Section: Predictiveness Of Self-constructs To Academicmentioning
confidence: 99%