Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck

Jarvis, Benjamin W.

doi:10.1111/papq.12012

Cited by 44 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…However, I shall argue that (1) the cognitive success attained in Z is not identical to the cognitive success attained in Z*; and that (2) because the cognitive successes made possible by the abilities (identically) involved in Z and Z* are different, these abilities do not explain the truth of the perceptual belief formed in Z in the way they explain its truth in Z* -which is why I am creditable for the truth of my belief in Z*, but not in Z. This, in a nutshell, is the "line of response available that [Kallestrup and Pritchard] have not considered", and it 3 This point seems to me to be quite indisputably established by Kallestrup and Pritchard's "epistemic twin earth argument" (Kallestrup and Pritchard 2014), and stands against the kind of view defended, for instance, by Jarvis (2013). Here, I shall simply rely on its intuitiveness.…”

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Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Gaultier

2014

Dialectica

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Theories of knowledge as credit for true belief, or as cognitive achievement, have to face the following objection: in the famous Barn façades case, it seems that the truth of Barney's belief that he is in front of a barn is to be explained by the correct functioning of his cognitive capacities, although we are reluctant to say that he knows he is in front of a barn. Duncan Pritchard concludes from this that a safety clause, irreducible to the conditions a true belief must satisfy in order to be credited to the believer, constitutes a necessary condition of knowledge. Because those who define knowledge as a cognitive achievement have not convincingly answered this objection, I intend, in the first section of this paper, to refute it by showing how practical and doxastic achievements differ. Then I defend the idea that we should also distinguish two kinds of environmental epistemic luck, and, correlatively, two kinds of safety, that are not equally incompatible with knowledge. Finally, I argue that this distinction is inevitably vague and I indicate some consequences of this vagueness for our knowledge‐intuitions.

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“… This point seems to me to be quite indisputably established by Kallestrup and Pritchard's “epistemic twin earth argument” (Kallestrup and Pritchard ), and stands against the kind of view defended, for instance, by Jarvis (). Here, I shall simply rely on its intuitiveness.…”

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Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Gaultier

2014

Dialectica

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“…However, I focus almost exclusively on the nonepistemic examples Pritchard uses to make his case. Pritchard (, ) distinguishes between two kinds of veritic luck: intervening and environmental (see also Carter and Jarvis ). Moving from the epistemic domain to the sports performance domain, let's use a favorite example of virtue epistemologists: an archer shooting an arrow .…”

Section: “Intervening” and “Environmental” Luckmentioning

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You Make Your Own Luck

McKinnon

2014

Metaphilosophy

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This essay takes up two questions. First, what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck? At least colloquially speaking, luck is conceived as something out of an agent's control. So how could an agent increase or decrease the likelihood that she'll be lucky? Building on some recent work on the metaphysics of luck, the essay argues that there is a sense in which agents can create their own luck because people with more skill tend to have more opportunities to benefit from luck. Second, what implications does this conception of luck have for related topics such as how we evaluate performances (like shooting an arrow), including coming to know something? The ubiquitous presence of luck in our actions is often underappreciated. The essay argues that when we combine an expected outcomes view of luck with a counterfactual view of causation, the distinction between environmental and intervening veritic luck seems to disappear. We need a more nuanced view of how luck sometimes undermines credit for success in agents' actions. The upshot of this view is that while luck may undermine the creditworthiness of an agent's success, it only partially undermines creditworthiness.

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“…She left the others because she thought that she heard someone 21 I used to think he was right, but I now think that it's not for reasons discussed in Littlejohn (2014). Like Carter (2013) and Jarvis (2013), I'm skeptical of the idea that the environmental luck cases are cases in which the correctness of your predication is attributable to the exercise of your abilities.…”

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confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck

Cited by 44 publications

References 31 publications

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

You Make Your Own Luck

How and Why Knowledge is First

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