How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn, Clayton

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0002

Cited by 65 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Broad factualists need to say something substantive about what it takes to possess (= to access, to have) a reason. For if reasons are facts or true propositions they are not automatically within one's ken in a way that could justify one's attitudes and actions (Williamson 2000;Whiting 2014;Schroeder 2015;Sylvan 2015Sylvan , 2016Sylvan , 2018Littlejohn 2017;Neta 2017;Lord 2018a). Imagine that you are currently standing in front of an oak tree and you have no other information about the oak apart from your general knowledge of oaks and what you can visually "pick up" about this oak while looking at it.…”

Section: Background I: a Quick Primer On Reasons-first Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One prominent view of possession is centered on knowledge: we possess only those facts that we know (Williamson 2000;Littlejohn 2017): 3…”

Section: Background Ii: Motivations For Knowledge-centric Views Of Pomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…fact P as a reason only if we know P (Williamson 2000;Littlejohn 2017) or we are in a position to know P (Lord 2018a;Neta 2017).…”

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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach

Silva

2020

Synthese

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In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s (2018a) view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession.

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Section: Background I: a Quick Primer On Reasons-first Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One prominent view of possession is centered on knowledge: we possess only those facts that we know (Williamson 2000;Littlejohn 2017): 3…”

Section: Background Ii: Motivations For Knowledge-centric Views Of Pomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach

Silva

2020

Synthese

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“…At least, the case Littlejohn presents in his (2013). For a different argument for thinking that Knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief, see Littlejohn (2017). I hope to address this elsewhere.…”

Section: Epistemic Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Worth

Whiting¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person's action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I introduce an analogue of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person's belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. While the notion of epistemic worth is independently interesting, the main aim is to show that appealing to it provides a response to arguments against the view that truth is the fundamental norm for belief and, thereby, to arguments for the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. The direction of travel does not only run from ethics to epistemology. In closing, I tentatively suggest that some of the points to emerge when developing the account of epistemic worth might prompt revisions to the account of moral worth. 'Truth, schmuth,' Captain Sham said. If you don't care about something, one way to demonstrate your feelings is to say the word and then repeat the word with the letters S-C-H-M replacing the real first letters. Somebody who didn't care about dentists, for instance, could say 'Dentists, schmentists'. But only a despicable person like Captain Sham wouldn't care about the truth.

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“…1 See, for example, Littlejohn 2013Littlejohn , 2014Littlejohn , 2017Littlejohn , 2018Williamson 2005aWilliamson , 2005b forthcoming. See also Sutton 2007.…”

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confidence: 99%

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Fassio

2019

Dialogue

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According to a popular view in contemporary epistemology, a belief is justified if, and only if, it amounts to knowledge. Upholders of this view also hold that knowledge is the fundamental norm governing belief and that conforming to this norm is both necessary and sufficient for justification. I argue against the claim that mere norm conformity is sufficient for justification. Rather, justification requires norm conformity for sufficient undefeated reasons. An important consequence is the rejection of the claim that conformity to the norm of belief is necessary and sufficient for epistemic justification. I illustrate some interesting consequences of this result.

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How and Why Knowledge is First

Cited by 65 publications

References 32 publications

Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach

Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach

Epistemic Worth

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

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