Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA.

Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and “Rogue-State” Nuclear Threats

“…Although the tone and verdicts of the NIEs served the interests and perspectives, in the 1960s, of the McNamara‐led defense establishment (its desire to constrain growing nuclear arsenals and reduce Cold War tension), this changed with the administration. Henry Kissinger, as National Security Advisor, shared President Nixon’s wariness of the CIA (and its ostensible links to the liberal Establishment) and expressed disdain for what he viewed as the unprovocative, unsubstantiated, and overly consensual inferences of the NIEs (Cahn 1998:75, 88). Thus, the early 1970s brought a weakening of CIA influence and bureaucratic standing, the demise of ONE, and the restructuring of the NIE drafting process (Freedman 1977:52–56).…”

“…Thus, the early 1970s brought a weakening of CIA influence and bureaucratic standing, the demise of ONE, and the restructuring of the NIE drafting process (Freedman 1977:52–56). Through the power of appointment at all bureaucratic levels and the redesigning of the bureaucracy for drafting NIEs (allowing for greater input of alternative viewpoints), the NIEs recorded the preferences of the new administration (Cahn 1998:102–107).…”

“…Congress 1978). Admittedly, there is little evidence that the Team B report, which broadly criticized NIE assumptions about Soviet objectives (Prados 1993:28–29; Betts 2003:68), swayed high level officials or affected more than the “tone” of NIEs to follow (Cahn 1998:159–162, 173). Still, the view that the Soviets were seeking a nuclear war‐fighting and winning capability and subordinating deterrence to the effort became NIE mainstays until the Cold War’s end.…”