Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and “Rogue-State” Nuclear Threats

Abstract

United States estimates of Soviet nuclear goals and capabilities and the current ''rogue-state'' nuclear threat reflected prevailing beliefs about threat within the U.S. government and the relative influence of agencies charged with threat assessment. This article establishes that the patterns in formal Soviet threat assessment: (i) did not reflect a uniform response to ''external threat,'' (ii) were inevitably tied to underlying assumptions about adversary intent, and (iii) were susceptible then to perceptual, organizational, and ⁄ or political influences within government. Thus, threat assessments reflected the optimism and pessimism-and political interests and ideologies-of those who participated in the estimating process. The article concludes by examining these lessons in light of the experiences and challenges of assessing threat from small states harboring nuclear ambitions.

A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Salt Lake) Lagoon

“…Traditionally, national threat perceptions are salient in threat perceptions literature (see Blank, 2008;Chourchoulis, 2012;Darwich, 2016;Farnham, 2003;Fordham, 1998;Gries et al, 2009;Jung, 2010;Kemmelmeier, & Winter, 2000;Minkina, 2011;Ridout, Grosse, & Appleton, 2008;Sinkkonen, & Elovainio, 2020;Tamaki, 2012;Vinayaraj, 2009;Zhu, 2002). Threat of nuclear war had been added to this during the Cold War (see Lebovic, 2009;Mayton II, 1986;Schatz, & Fiske, 1992). However, recently, for many societies, threat perceptions moved from the Cold War mentality towards terrorism (Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley Jr, 2005;Leventhal, & Chellaney, 1988;Malhotra & Popp, 2012;Nissen et al, 2015;Pelletier, & Drozda-Senkowska, 2016;Stevens et al, 2011), foreigners (Watts, 1996), minorities (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008;Tahir, Kunst, & Sam, 2019;Verkuyten, 2009), refugees (Thomsen, & Rafiqi, 2020), immigrants and/or immigration (Araújo et al, 2019;Badea, Bender, & Korda, 2020;Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015;Bianco, Kosic, & Pierro, 2022;Blinder, & Lundgren, 2019;Canetti et al, 2016;Erisen, & Kentmen-Cin, 2017;Escandell, & Ce...…”

Exceptionalism in American foreign policy: Is it exceptional?

“…These characteristics provide a perceptual foundation for intelligence estimates. During the Cold War and the George Bush administration's handling of the Iraq problem, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) chronically over estimated both the capabilities and intentions of America's main adversaries (Lebovic, 2009). This exaggeration derives in part from a broader American public perception of the world as a hostile place, an environment in which America must constantly strive to control and eliminate evildoers before their malevolent acts hit the American homeland.…”

“…These characteristics provide a perceptual foundation for intelligence estimates. During the Cold War and the George Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq problem, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) chronically over estimated both the capabilities and intentions of America’s main adversaries (Lebovic, 2009).…”