Kant und das Problem der Zurechenbarkeit

Bojanowski, Jochen

doi:10.3196/004433007781147803

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Human willing,according to Kant,isacapacity to be the cause of the realityofobjects not just in accordance with principles (as is the case with respect to non-rational animal activity) but by means of the representation of principles. Consequently, if an action werep er-1 With respect to Kant'sp ractical philosophy, no single interpretative position-apart perhaps from John Rawls'" CI Procedure"-has enjoyed as much support as the IT.F or examples of uses of the IT followingi ts introduction by Allison (1991), see Wood (1999,5 1 -53),H ill (1991a, 86), Timmons (1994,1 16-19), Johnson (1998), Morrisson (2005), Bojanowski (2007), Papish (2007, 129-130), Guyer( 2008, 51-53 and 293-94), Schadow (2012, 112, n. 90,1 80-186,a nd 291,n .1 22), and Kang (2015,9 6 -101). Jens Timmermann (2003,1 5) thinks Allison'sI Ta ccount requires supplementation by amoredetailed account of the role of maxims in Kant'stheory of action and moral psychology but does not disputethe thesis itself.…”

Section: Aproblem Fort He Kantianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want

Berg

2023

Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective

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Even am orallyg ood practical agent does not act solelyf rom ther ecognition of the abstract demands of moral duty.Often, she actst os atisfy desires for particular ends that are not intrinsicallym oral. But if freedom, as Kant claims, consists in acting from universal principles one adopts from respect for the moral law, how can agents freely act to satisfy desires for particulare nds? The standard answer to this question, the so-called Incorporation Thesis, is, Ia rgue, unsatisfactory both as an interpretation of Kant and on philosophical grounds. I propose instead that,for Kant,the capacity to act freely forthe sake of aparticular, non-intrinsicallymoral end is not exhausted by theability to step back, reflect and decide whether adesire is or can provide areason to act.Rather,K ant shows, the place for the pursuit of particular ends is determined by practicallyr ational agents' spontaneous constitution of their moralc haracter,w hereby they subordinate the pursuit of material,p articular endst ot he pursuit of formal, moral ones or vice versa. 1I ntroductionLet us begin with an apparentlyindisputable fact: amoral agent does not act solely from the recognition of her general moral duties. In performing aconcrete action, she acts to realize particular ends, which maybegiven by,ortraced to desires that are not intrinsicallymoral. In such cases, the explanation of the action will not be exhausted by the fact of the agent'srecognition of her general moral duties.Toget into view the kinds of case Ihaveinmind, suppose Ireach for apiece of cake. Such an act maybemorallybad, as when Ireach for someone else'spiece of cake, having first made sure its rightful owners are distracted; it maya lso be morallyp ermissible, as when Itry apiece freelyoffered to me because Iwould liketofind out what it tastes like; and it mayevenbemorallyworthy, as when Ireach for the slice that seems bestt om e, among many, but onlyi nsofar as Ir ecognize that, in addition to my hankeringfor some cake, it is my duty to sustainmylife or offer support to my friend, the aspiring pastry chef. Amoral theory oughttorender the possibility of-as well as the differences between-these kinds of actions intelligible.On the face of it,however,itisnot obvious how the standard Kantian account of action could make sense of these ordinary intuitions, and in particularo ft he

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Section: Aproblem Fort He Kantianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want

Berg

2023

Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective

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“…16 Cf. Bojanowski 2007. 17 Kant does not speak explicitly of pure practical reason in subsection two.…”

Section: Deduction Of the Freedom Of Pure Rational Beings In Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on the Justification of Moral Principles

Bojanowski

2017

Kant-Studien

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Abstract:In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to give a deduction of the categorical imperative. There is widespread disagreement as to how Kant's argument is supposed to proceed. Many commentators believe that Kant's deduction fails because some of its argumentative moves are unjustified. In particular, Kant makes a mistaken inference from theoretical freedom to practical freedom, and his axiological 'superiority claim' regarding the noumenal world's priority over the sensible world is unjustified. According to the standard incompatibilist story, Kant came to see that his deduction was flawed by the time he wrote the Critique of Practical Reason, at which point he claimed that the truth of the moral law does not require a deduction since it is a "fact of pure reason". The moral law is no longer the conclusion of his argument; instead, it functions as the premise of an argument that establishes our freedom. Other commentators endorse a compatibilist reading, according to which the justifications of the moral law in Groundwork III and the second Critique are compatible because Kant never attempted to give the strong kind of deduction that he rightly rejects in the second Critique. On the view I develop here, the particular argumentative moves that the standard incompatibilist takes issue with are not flawed and incompatible with Kant's second Critique.

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“…Zum anderen zeigt sich die kausale Rolle der Vorstellung bei Wünschen gerade darin, dass diese selbst dann noch zu Versuchen führen kçnnen, wenn wir von der Vergeblichkeit unserer Bemühungen restlos überzeugt sind. Dass wir in den meisten Fällen die kausale Rolle der Vorstellung in unseren tatleeren Wünschen nicht bemerken, liegt wohl daran, dass, wie Kant Bojanowski, 2007;Zçller, 2005. 58 Vgl.…”

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Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen (MS 6:211 – 214)

Höwing¹

2013

Kant's "Tugendlehre"

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Kant und das Problem der Zurechenbarkeit

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want

Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want

Kant on the Justification of Moral Principles

Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen (MS 6:211 – 214)

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