Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want

Abstract

Even am orallyg ood practical agent does not act solelyf rom ther ecognition of the abstract demands of moral duty.Often, she actst os atisfy desires for particular ends that are not intrinsicallym oral. But if freedom, as Kant claims, consists in acting from universal principles one adopts from respect for the moral law, how can agents freely act to satisfy desires for particulare nds? The standard answer to this question, the so-called Incorporation Thesis, is, Ia rgue, unsatisfactory both as an interpretation of Kant and on philosophical grounds. I propose instead that,for Kant,the capacity to act freely forthe sake of aparticular, non-intrinsicallymoral end is not exhausted by theability to step back, reflect and decide whether adesire is or can provide areason to act.Rather,K ant shows, the place for the pursuit of particular ends is determined by practicallyr ational agents' spontaneous constitution of their moralc haracter,w hereby they subordinate the pursuit of material,p articular endst ot he pursuit of formal, moral ones or vice versa. 1I ntroductionLet us begin with an apparentlyindisputable fact: amoral agent does not act solely from the recognition of her general moral duties. In performing aconcrete action, she acts to realize particular ends, which maybegiven by,ortraced to desires that are not intrinsicallymoral. In such cases, the explanation of the action will not be exhausted by the fact of the agent'srecognition of her general moral duties.Toget into view the kinds of case Ihaveinmind, suppose Ireach for apiece of cake. Such an act maybemorallybad, as when Ireach for someone else'spiece of cake, having first made sure its rightful owners are distracted; it maya lso be morallyp ermissible, as when Itry apiece freelyoffered to me because Iwould liketofind out what it tastes like; and it mayevenbemorallyworthy, as when Ireach for the slice that seems bestt om e, among many, but onlyi nsofar as Ir ecognize that, in addition to my hankeringfor some cake, it is my duty to sustainmylife or offer support to my friend, the aspiring pastry chef. Amoral theory oughttorender the possibility of-as well as the differences between-these kinds of actions intelligible.On the face of it,however,itisnot obvious how the standard Kantian account of action could make sense of these ordinary intuitions, and in particularo ft he