Kant on Conscience, “Indirect” Duty, and Moral Error

Timmermann, Jens

doi:10.5840/ipq200646314

Cited by 36 publications

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“…How, then, can we stop this ascent to higher and higher levels? 12 For studies of Kant's theory of conscience, see Hill (2002), Timmermann (2006), Wood (2008, and my (2009). Later on I will show where Fichte's theory of conscience differs from Kant's.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fichte on Conscience

Ware

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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There is no question that Fichte's theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations -the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case-the Formal Function View. My aim in this paper is to offer a new contribution to this debate. I begin by supplying further evidence in support of the view that conscience only plays a formal function in Fichte's ethics. Then I call attention to a deeper problem this view faces, namely, that it invites an infinite regress by making one's conviction a matter of higher-order reflection. The key to overcoming this threat, I argue, lies in Fichte's doctrine of feeling, whereby the criterion of one's conviction lies, not in a cognitive state, but in an affective state. In closing, I discuss the relevance of Fichte's theory for current debates over the nature of moral error and moral deference.It is an absolute duty not to accept any command or dictum without examining it for oneself, but first to test it through one's own conscience; it is absolutely unconscionable to omit this test.-Fichte (SL 4:177).

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confidence: 99%

Fichte on Conscience

Ware

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…After all, as Kant said, we do not have duties to animals. According to Timmermann (: 298), ‘indirect duty is not even a lesser kind of duty: it is not a species of duty at all’. Indirect duties are prescriptions to create conditions that are auspicious to the fulfilment of direct duty.…”

Section: Correction Of Wide Duties To Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

Sticker

2016

European J of Philosophy

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There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self‐deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self‐deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.

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“…I therefore analyse conscience in the context of two phenomena central to Kant's practical philosophy: ordinary moral-cognition and selfdeception. My paper thus stands in a recent tradition of shedding light on conscience via its relation to other elements of Kant's practical philosophy, such as indirect duty (Timmermann 2006), the Fact of Reason (Moyar 2008), the duty to self-knowledge (Ware 2009), and the Aesthetic Preliminary Concepts (Guyer 2010).…”

Section: When the Reflective Watch-dog Barksmentioning

confidence: 99%

When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant

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2016

J Value Inquiry

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Kant on Conscience, “Indirect” Duty, and Moral Error

Cited by 36 publications

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Fichte on Conscience

Fichte on Conscience

Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant

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