When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant

Sticker, Martin

doi:10.1007/s10790-016-9559-4

Cited by 33 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Humans may 'artificialize ' [künsteln] as much as they want to represent moral transgressions as an 'unintentional fault' or mere 'oversight' but their 'advocate' before conscience cannot 'reduce to silence the prosecutor within' (CPrR, V: 98.13-21; see also Rel, VI: 77.27). I discuss agents' attempts to avoid conscience's reprimands in Sticker (2016a),where I argue that Kant's model of an internal court is inadequate to account for the pervasive threat self-deception poses. In addition, I am sceptical of Kant's claims that conscience is infallible (Sticker 2020a).…”

Section: Empirical Practical Reasonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom22 In other publications, I have expanded on various aspects of common human reason inKant, specifically: on its methodological significance(Sticker 2016b(Sticker , 2017a(Sticker , 2017b; on moral epistemology(Sticker 2015); conscience(Sticker 2016a); and questions of (cultural) plurality of conceptions of morality(Sticker 2021a). The following brings together salient points made in these publications.23 See G, IV: 393.5-7, 397.18-19; TP, VIII: 284.30-3; RPT, VIII: 403.23-5; Ped, IX: 493.35-494.4.…”

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Rationalizing (<i>Vernünfteln</i>)

Sticker

2021

Self Cite

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Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.

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Section: Empirical Practical Reasonmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Rationalizing (<i>Vernünfteln</i>)

Sticker

2021

Self Cite

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“…Proust (2005), p. 226. 6 For a characterization of practical rationalizing in Kant, seevan Ackeren and Sticker (2015), p. 77, p. 85;Sticker (2017a),Sticker (2017b); however, without reference to the more general problem of a dialectic of reason and of the problem of irrationality. For this problem, seeNoller (2021a).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Logic of Illusion: Kant on the Reasons of Error

Noller

2021

Theoria

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In this paper, I reconstruct Immanuel Kant's theory of theoretical and practical error, and I situate it within the broader context of his transcendental philosophy. I thereby refer to his conception of dialectic as the logic of illusion (CpR, B 86) and to his concept of rationalizing. By referring to Donald Davidson's conception of irrationality, I argue that Kant's theory of error allows us to keep the erring person responsible both in theoretical and practical regards.

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“…See Martin Sticker (). I say a little more about the relation of my account to Kant's account of conscience in Footnote 15.…”

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Kant on moral self‐opacity

Berg

2020

European J of Philosophy

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It has been widely accepted that Kant holds the "Opacity Thesis," the claim that we cannot know the ultimate grounds of our actions. Understood in this way, I shall argue, the Opacity Thesis is at odds with Kant's account of practical self-consciousness, according to which I act from the (always potentially conscious) representation of principles of action and that, in particular, in acting from duty I act in consciousness of the moral law's determination of my will. The Opacity Thesis thus threatens to render acting from duty unintelligible. To diffuse the threat, I argue, first, that we need not attribute the Opacity Thesis to Kant. Kant's concern with the ubiquity of moral selfopacity does not imply the strong skeptical conclusion that knowledge of the grounds of one's action is impossible. Second, I show how moral self-opacity in cases of morally bad action emerges from the intrinsic inability of representing to oneself what one is doing, insofar one is pursuing the indeterminate end of "happiness." 1 | INTRODUCTION The greatest obstacle to moral uprightness, for Kant, is neither figuring out what the right thing to do is (everyone, in the first place, knows what duty requires of them, KpV 5:36) nor is it, strictly speaking, overcoming the temptation to transgress (for in knowing ourselves to be free we know that we could, in principle, overcome any pathological temptation and do what is right, MS 6:380, R 6:47). The greatest obstacle is rather self-deception, a peculiar "ability" to hide from our own selves the grounds of our own actions. For, repeatedly, Kant warns that even when we have done the nominally right thing, we can be deceived about why it is we acted as we have-fancying ourselves to have been motivated morally, when in fact we were only pursuing our contingent desires. 1 On the basis of Kant's statements about the possibility and ubiquity of moral self-deception, 2 interpreters have widely attributed to him the "Opacity Thesis," according to which we cannot know the genuine grounds of any given action-not only the actions of others but even our own. Consequently, we cannot know whether any given action is

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When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant

Cited by 33 publications

References 9 publications

Rationalizing (<i>Vernünfteln</i>)

Rationalizing (<i>Vernünfteln</i>)

The Logic of Illusion: Kant on the Reasons of Error

Kant on moral self‐opacity

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