John Rawls

Rawls’ methodological blueprint

“…Or one might talk of the dominance of normative theory by ‘meta-ethics’, and not just because the meta-ethical thinking of the day, as described, seemed to render meaningful argument about political principles impossible, but also because Rawls himself strove to show how the latter could be made ‘independent’ of the former, regardless of the positions that subject ends up adopting (Rawls, 1999: 286–302). The key thing though is this: what Rawls was doing in Theory was providing us with a method for meaningfully comparing the merits of different moral and political principles at a time when such comparison seemed impossible (Audard, 2007: 5; Freeman, 2007: 12; Graham, 2007: 4–5; Lehning, 2009: 12–15).…”

“…In other words, his primary legacy is methodological , in the sense that he standardised a particular way of doing political philosophy, or, more precisely, a particular method for the justification of political principles. This is why it makes sense to say that he created a ‘common disciplinary discourse’ (Lehning, 2009: 14), that he gave us ‘new ways to argue’ (Freeman, 2007: 459), that he inaugurated a ‘formidably productive paradigm in moral, social, and political philosophy’ (Maffetone, 2010: 14), and that, even if his conception of justice was not particularly original, the way he argued about it was (Audard, 2007: 7; Freeman, 2007: x; Graham, 2007: 167; Maffetone, 2010: 10). Yet there is still confusion about that method, despite such standardisation.…”

“…Given such confusion, we can be grateful for the gradual emergence of a range of books on Rawls’ works when taken as a whole , and in particular the light this approach sheds on the continuous method underpinning those works: justification via reflective equilibrium (Audard, 2007; Freeman, 2007; Graham, 2007; Lehning, 2009; Mandle and Reidy, 2014; Maffetone, 2010; Pogge, 2007b). This, in short, is the idea that runs from the first of Rawls’ works to the last, that explains, more than anything else, their fundamental character, and that became standard for a subject that was revitalised as a direct result of the promise it held.…”

Rawls’s duty of assistance and relative deprivation: Why less is more and more is even more

“…While certainly not on an equal footing, international terrorism and unwanted immigration are seen as two negative externalities that motivate liberal societies to assist burdened societies to become well-ordered. 7 While the duty of assistance is just that, a moral duty, it is presented to well-ordered peoples more as a command of reason than as a demand of justice (Shaw, 2005: 225; see also Audard, 2007: 273; Beitz, 2000: 689; Cabrera, 2001: 176; Risse, 2005: 109):To argue that liberal nations might enjoy enhanced security and prosperity should they help burden peoples achieve minimally just and stable institutions is to appeal neither to the moral resources of any liberal comprehensive doctrine nor even to political liberalism’s own political virtues of tolerance and reasonableness. It is only to summon decent nations to their strategic self-interest.…”

Um procedimento razoável para o julgamento equitativo: a vertente abstracionista

“…Justice as reciprocity is the conception that, for him [Rawls], combines de Prudential value of cooperation whit the moral value of equal respect, of treating each other impartially." (AUDARD, 2007, p. 38). vol.…”