Item Non‐Response to Financial Questions in Household Surveys: An Experimental Study of Interviewer and Mode Effects*

Essig, Lothar; Winter, Joachim

doi:10.1111/j.1475-5890.2009.00100.x

Cited by 25 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(20 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…9 To be precise: the interview is conducted with the individual who knows best about the household's finances. 10 As in all surveys that deal with sensitive topics such as household finances, item non-response to sensitive questions is not ignorable (see Essig and Winter (2003) and Schunk (2006) for discussion and documentation). To prevent biased inference based on an analysis of complete cases only, an iterative multiple imputation procedure has been applied to the SAVE data (Schunk, 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform

Börsch‐Supan

Reil-Held²,

Schunk

2008

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all developed countries. In many countries, governments aim to fill the resulting gap with subsidized private pensions. This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the uptake of voluntary, but heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Specifically, we investigate how the uptake of the recently introduced 'Riester pensions' depends on state-provided saving incentives, and how well the targeting at families and low-income households works in practice.We show that, after a slow start, private pension plans took off very quickly. While saving incentives were effective in reaching parents, they were less successful in attracting low-income earners, although Riester pensions exhibit a more equal pattern by income than occupational pensions and unsubsidized private pension plans.We also provide circumstantial evidence on displacement effects between saving for old-age provision and other purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have a Riester pension. The same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational pensions and other forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as substitutes.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform

Börsch‐Supan

Reil-Held²,

Schunk

2008

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…1 1 See, e.g., Essig and Winter (2009), Kalwij (2010) We consider correlations that can be useful in the assignment of interviewers to respondents. Of particular interest are our data on interviewing style.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey misreporting of welfare receipt—Respondent, interviewer, and interview characteristics

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Overall, the dataset consists of 1,538 individuals apart from the estimations that include the two income variables HH income and Individual income. These variables are typically prone to missing values; however the share of missing values is -compared to other surveys -relatively small within this dataset (see Essig and Winter 2009). Apart from the variables age and age squared, all other independent variables are binary.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

The Political Economics of Social Health Insurance: The Tricky Case of Individuals’ Preferences

Pfarr

Schmid

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social health insurance systems can be designed with different levels of state involvement and varying degrees of redistribution. In this article we focus on citizens' preferences regarding the design of their health insurance coverage including the extent of redistribution. Using a microeconomic model we hypothesize that the individual's preferred options are determined by the relative income position and the relative risk of falling ill. Only individuals who expect to realize a net profit through the implicit redistributive transfers will favour a public insurance coverage over a private one. We test this hypothesis empirically using three distinct approaches. The first two are based on survey questions focusing on the type of coverage and the degree of redistribution respectively. The third is based on a discrete choice experiment thus accounting for trade-offs and budget constraints. The data is from a representative sample of 1.538 German individuals who were surveyed and participated in the DCE in early 2012. We find that the model has to be rejected. There is a wide consensus that redistributive elements should be an integral part of the social health insurance system and could even be extended. However, there are also preferences for health insurance coverage that can be individually optimized.

show abstract

Item Non‐Response to Financial Questions in Household Surveys: An Experimental Study of Interviewer and Mode Effects*

Cited by 25 publications

References 22 publications

Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform

Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform

Survey misreporting of welfare receipt—Respondent, interviewer, and interview characteristics

The Political Economics of Social Health Insurance: The Tricky Case of Individuals’ Preferences

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About