Islamic State in Yemen – A Rival to al-Qaeda?

Clausen, Maria‐Louise

doi:10.11610/connections.16.1.04

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The conflicting groups were competing over territory and natural resources in Yemen. Al-Qaeda and ISIS were highly active in Yemen (Clausen, 2011). Ongoing wars and conflicts have destroyed the country's economy and people's well-being.…”

Section: Social Identity Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Saudi Arabian-Led Intervention in Yemen Conflicts

Li¹

2023

GJAHSS

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The conflict in Yemen started as a civil war, which was perpetuated by various conflicting groups’ attempts to address and compete for political, economic, and social influence in Yemen (Byers & Stewart, n.d.). However, the Saudi Arabian-led intervention has escalated the local conflicts and transformed the conflicts in Yemen into a significant regional and global competition between different countries and regional sects (Byers & Stewart, n.d.). The main goals of this research are to protect children’s rights and safety, as well as prevent armed conflicts in Yemen. The author will analyze the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemeni conflicts by using social identity theory, the theory of structural violence, and the theory of offensive realism. Social identity theory provides a notion that conflicts between groups might be caused by favoritism towards in-group members and marginalization towards out-group members (Turner & Tajfel, 1986). The theory of structural violence explains the interrelationships among structural inequality, poverty, and violence in society (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). The theory of offensive realism illustrates the political, economic, and territorial factors that attracted different nations and sects to participate in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention of the Yemeni conflicts (Lobell, 2010). Moreover, the author will introduce interest-based mediation to conflicting parties to allow them to explore alternatives for making peace (Moore, 1987). The integrated analyses of theories and intervention practice will enhance the understanding of this conflicting case, as well as provide a comprehensive understanding about parties’ interests and the importance of protecting children’s rights in the conflicts.

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Section: Social Identity Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Saudi Arabian-Led Intervention in Yemen Conflicts

Li¹

2023

GJAHSS

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“…For example, Shaikh Abdul Majeed Zindani remained convinced that by not making a clear statement regarding his intentions, Obama sought to maintain the option of declaring Yemen a failing state and capturing its oil sources (Terrill, 2011, 66–68, 73). Officials in Washington had their own suspicions of Saleh’s government, and some even thought that he encouraged the AQAP to survive to keep Yemen dependent on U.S.aid (Clausen, 2017, p. 54).…”

Section: The United States and Second Yemeni Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constraints and Adjustments in the US–Yemeni Relations

Abadi

2021

Contemporary Review of the Middle East

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This article analyzes the course of US–Yemeni relations from the 1940s to the present and aims to explain the reasons for the twists and turns in bilateral relations. It argues that the US government never developed a unique “Yemen policy” and that its attitude toward that country was determined largely by its ties with Saudi Arabia. Yemen began to loom large in US foreign policy in the early 1960s when Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser intervened on behalf of the Republicans who staged a coup against the Royal imamate regime, which relied on Saudi support. The article shows that President John Kennedy looked favorably on the new Republican regime in Yemen despite the robust relations that existed between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia. In addition, it argues that despite the war in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 to 1970 and caused instability in this region, this country did not loom large in US foreign policy. This was largely due to the British presence in south Yemen and especially in the port of Aden, which lasted until 1967. The article shows how the British withdrawal from Aden increased Yemen’s value in the eyes of US policymakers, but even then, no effort was made to fashion a unique policy toward this country. In addition, the article demonstrates how Washington’s attitude changed in 1969 when the country was divided into North Yemen, which tended to regard the Soviet Union as its protector and South Yemen, which continued to rely on US aid. And lastly, the article traces US–Yemeni relations from 1990, when the country reunited, until the present. It demonstrates how the bilateral relations were affected by the superpowers’ rivalry during the Cold War, the fight against terrorism, and disagreement between the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States.

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“…Most serious scholars of Yemen understand that AQAP is socially complex and that there are multiple layers to its existence (Bonnefoy, 2011; Johnsen, 2013; Kendall, 2016). Some refer to the fact that ‘in Yemen it is widely held that [former President] Salih created or allowed AQAP to thrive in order to secure US economic and military aid’ (Clausen, 2017: 54), or refer to an apparent ‘tacit non-aggression pact’ between the regime and AQAP (Johnsen, 2013: 144, 181–186; Kendall, 2018: 2). The ICG (2017: 2) notes that many Yemenis see ‘the group as a tool for Yemen’s political elite to resort to subterfuge for financial and military gain’.…”

Section: Legible Al-qa’idamentioning

confidence: 99%

Making al-Qa’ida legible: Counter-terrorism and the reproduction of terrorism

Phillips

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Why did America’s counter-terrorism strategy in Yemen fail to contain al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula in the years prior to the Yemeni government’s collapse in 2015? Moreover, why did the US administration think that its strategy was successful? This article draws from field research in Yemen and a diverse array of other Yemeni sources to argue that the answer lies in the fact that there are two broad, but ultimately irreconcilable, ontologies of what al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula ‘really is’: one legible, organisationally rational and thus governable; and one not entirely so. I argue that by targeting tangible elements of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (such as its leaders, sources of revenue and bases) in partnership with the Yemeni state security apparatus, the strategy strengthened the group’s less coherent aspects. As a result, Western counter-terrorism practices target a stripped-down, synoptic version of the group while missing, even empowering, the shadowy appendage of state or hegemonic power that animates popular Yemeni discourses. This article is concerned with what al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula looks like when we prioritise Yemeni observations about how it emerged and is reproduced. I argue that seeing al-Qa’ida as at least partly illegible removes counter-terrorism’s obvious targets, making it more suited to quelling anxieties than actually preventing terrorism.

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Islamic State in Yemen – A Rival to al-Qaeda?

Cited by 6 publications

References 2 publications

Saudi Arabian-Led Intervention in Yemen Conflicts

Saudi Arabian-Led Intervention in Yemen Conflicts

Constraints and Adjustments in the US–Yemeni Relations

Making al-Qa’ida legible: Counter-terrorism and the reproduction of terrorism

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