Making al-Qa’ida legible: Counter-terrorism and the reproduction of terrorism

Abstract

Why did America’s counter-terrorism strategy in Yemen fail to contain al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula in the years prior to the Yemeni government’s collapse in 2015? Moreover, why did the US administration think that its strategy was successful? This article draws from field research in Yemen and a diverse array of other Yemeni sources to argue that the answer lies in the fact that there are two broad, but ultimately irreconcilable, ontologies of what al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula ‘really is’: one legible, organisationally rational and thus governable; and one not entirely so. I argue that by targeting tangible elements of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (such as its leaders, sources of revenue and bases) in partnership with the Yemeni state security apparatus, the strategy strengthened the group’s less coherent aspects. As a result, Western counter-terrorism practices target a stripped-down, synoptic version of the group while missing, even empowering, the shadowy appendage of state or hegemonic power that animates popular Yemeni discourses. This article is concerned with what al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula looks like when we prioritise Yemeni observations about how it emerged and is reproduced. I argue that seeing al-Qa’ida as at least partly illegible removes counter-terrorism’s obvious targets, making it more suited to quelling anxieties than actually preventing terrorism.

The law and politics of funding armed groups in Syria: how states (fail to) counter terrorism

“…A long-standing interdisciplinary scholarship has provided valuable insights into how European states produce, bend and violate international norms in the fight against terrorism, criticizing how governments enact and produce various definitions of terrorist organizations to distinguish them from other armed groups (Philips, 2019; Scheppele, 2010; Stampnitzky, 2013). This article has provided a detailed analysis of how terrorism definitions are negotiated and legitimized within a state.…”

“…The War on Terror is not only a contemporary fight against terrorist organizations, but also a form of governance informed by post-colonial understandings of international law and security (Parashar, 2018; Phillips, 2019). Hasian (2016: 13), in his work on terrorism financing cases, argues that the legal frameworks used for contemporary anti-terrorist statutes resemble some of the former colonial ways of governing and restricting ‘the financing of the subaltern “Other”’.…”

Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: The Role of Repression and State Capacity

“…To begin with, by state repression , I understand “political terror as violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question” (Gibney et al 2019, 1). In conflicts involving jihadist groups, the distinction between militants, dissidents, and civilians is often blurred (Phillips 2019, 1134-35; Thurston 2020, 213-14), which is why I expect this form of state repression to affect ordinary civilians as well as members of local insurgent groups.…”

Understanding Shifts in US Policies towards the Taliban: A Critical Analysis

“…25 It has also been argued that Western counterterrorism is underpinned by certain assumptions that prevent it from comprehending the complex manifestations of groups such as Al Qaeda at the local level. 26 As pointed out by Martini, the CTS has 'so far provided a wide critique and deconstruction of mainstream approaches and discourses to terrorism, extremism and radicalisation from a vast range of perspectives and methodologies.' 27 However, as Stritzel and Chang argued, it is important to study the actual implementation of counter-terrorism discourses to identify and study the interplay of power, resistance, and legitimacy in practice.…”