Is Partisan Alignment Electorally Rewarding? Evidence from Village Council Elections in India

Abstract

Is Partisan Alignment Electorally Rewarding? Evidence from Village Council Elections in India *Do ruling parties positively discriminate in favour of their own constituencies in allocating public resources? If they do, do they gain electorally in engaging in such a practice? This paper tests whether partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in the state of West Bengal in India, and whether incumbent local governments (village councils) gain electorally in the practice of partisan alignment. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we find that the village council level ruling-party spends significantly more in its own party constituencies as compared to opponent constituencies. We also find strong evidence of electoral rewards in the practice of partisan alignment. However, we find that the results differ between the two main ruling political parties at the village council level in the state.

How Do Voters Respond to Welfare vis-a-vis Public Good Programs? An Empirical Test for Clientelism

“…Our result that effect of political competition on allocation of private benefits is heterogeneous across politically aligned and non-aligned regions is consistent with evidence found in Dey and Sen (2016) and Gupta and Mukhopadhyay (2016). These authors examine the manipulation of funds by state and district officials for electoral advantage under the MGN-REGA 4 , a welfare program providing employment.…”

Political alignment in the time of weak parties : electoral advantages and subnational transfers in Colombia

“…The paper contributes to the growing literature on political alignment between different layers of government. The main results are in line with previous literature showing that political alignment influences subnational transfers and subsequent elections (Ade and Freier, 2013;Arulampalam et al, 2009;Borcan, 2016;Bracco et al, 2015;Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;Dey and Sen, 2016;Levitt and Snyder Jr., 1997;Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). This is one of the few papers focusing in a context of weak parties.…”

“…This can happen because local and national officers have a symbiotic relationship, in which they exchange transfers and control over local policy for votes and legislative support. In a broader context, abundant evidence has shown that political alignment siginficantly affects subnational transfers and electoral results in both developed and developing countries (Ade and Freier, 2013;Arulampalam et al, 2009;Borcan, 2016;Bracco et al, 2015;Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;Dey and Sen, 2016;Levitt and Snyder Jr., 1997;Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). While most of these studies are based on countries in which the center-periphery negotiation is mediated by relatively strong parties, less is known about alignment effects when the party system is weak.…”

Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

“…11 There is considerable evidence that local governments in West Bengal direct benefits towards swing voters (Bardhan et al 2015;Dey and Sen 2016).…”

“…Despite the promise that decentralization can improve targeting and implementation through better information and accountability, a growing literature argues that these programs have a mixed record. 1 Community-led programs are often captured by the local elite (see, for example World Development Report 2004; Mansuri and Rao 2013;Vera-Cossio 2018;Deserranno et al 2018), and there is evidence that local governments target their vote bank, rather than those who stand to benefit the most (Stokes 2005;Robinson and Verdier 2013;Bardhan et al 2015; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2016;Devarajan and Khemani 2016;Dey and Sen 2016).…”