Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement

Phillips, Dana

doi:10.22329/il.v28i2.541

Cited by 14 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…Internal: Internal argument is still possible in deep disagreements (Finocchiaro, 2011;Zarefsky, 2012). 2 Theoretical: Absolutely deep disagreements are impossible, since insofar as one can identify an other as one with whom one disagrees, one must see that other as one with whom one can argue (Feldman, 2005;Phillips, 2008;Siegel, 2014). As we have seen, Fogelin is inclined to pessimism.…”

Section: Polemicalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arrogance and deep disagreement

Aberdein¹

2020

Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism

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I intend to bring recent work applying virtue theory to the study of argument to bear on a much older problem, that of disagreements that resist rational resolution, sometimes termed "deep disagreements". Just as some virtue epistemologists have lately shifted focus onto epistemic vices, I shall argue that a renewed focus on the vices of argument can help to illuminate deep disagreements. In particular, I address the role of arrogance, both as a factor in the diagnosis of deep disagreements and as an obstacle to their mutually acceptable resolution. Arrogant arguers are likely to make any disagreements to which they are party seem deeper than they really are and arrogance impedes the strategies that we might adopt to resolve deep disagreements. As a case in point, since arrogant or otherwise vicious arguers cannot be trusted not to exploit such strategies for untoward ends, any policy for deep disagreement amelioration must require particularly close attention to the vices of argument, lest they be exploited by the unscrupulous.

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Section: Polemicalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arrogance and deep disagreement

Aberdein¹

2020

Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism

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“…Another way to put it is: can rational argument be "productive" on these deep questions? (Phillips 2008). In order to understand the notion of "progress" or "productive" here, we need a different notion of resolution of disagreement which involves more than simply the notion of consensus.…”

Section: Resolution Of a Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of authors have concurred with Fogelin's pessimism about the scope of rational argumentation in resolving deep disagreements (Campolo 2005;Turner 2005;Godden 2010;Barris 2018). But there has been considerable resistance to Fogelin's argument from those who are more optimistic (Lugg 1986;Memedi 2007;Phillips 2008;Siegel 2013;Aikin 2018b;Ranalli 2018a). I will focus here on the widely cited optimistic reply given by Richard Feldman (Feldman 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

Henderson

2020

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Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour.

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“…See Fogelin (2005, pp. 8-9) and Phillips (2008) for discussion. 10 For a comprehensive overview, see Pritchard (2016a, b).…”

Section: The Wittgensteinian Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Deep Disagreement?

Ranalli

2018

Topoi

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What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

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Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

Arrogance and deep disagreement

Arrogance and deep disagreement

Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

What is Deep Disagreement?

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