Arrogance and deep disagreement

Abstract

I intend to bring recent work applying virtue theory to the study of argument to bear on a much older problem, that of disagreements that resist rational resolution, sometimes termed "deep disagreements". Just as some virtue epistemologists have lately shifted focus onto epistemic vices, I shall argue that a renewed focus on the vices of argument can help to illuminate deep disagreements. In particular, I address the role of arrogance, both as a factor in the diagnosis of deep disagreements and as an obstacle to their mutually acceptable resolution. Arrogant arguers are likely to make any disagreements to which they are party seem deeper than they really are and arrogance impedes the strategies that we might adopt to resolve deep disagreements. As a case in point, since arrogant or otherwise vicious arguers cannot be trusted not to exploit such strategies for untoward ends, any policy for deep disagreement amelioration must require particularly close attention to the vices of argument, lest they be exploited by the unscrupulous.

Cognitive Peerhood, Epistemic Disdain, and Affective Polarisation: The Perils of Disagreeing Deeply

“…This behaviour fits into what Kidd calls vice-charging , “the critical practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice” (Kidd 2016: 181). Thus, epistemic disdain is connected to epistemic vices because a negative judgement of the other side usually comes as accusations of epistemic vices, such as closed-mindedness, dogmatism, or arrogance (Aberdein 2020; Lynch 2020). But is epistemic disdain itself an epistemic vice?…”

Populism and the Virtues of Argument

“…I have discussed arrogance as a vice of arguers elsewhere (Aberdein, 2020). Indeed, the association of arrogance and argument is an ancient one: as Paul Weithman observes, "Aquinas numbered the argumentative vices of contention, discord and pertinacity among the daughters of vainglory" (Weithman, 1991, 470 f.).…”

Deep Disagreement in Mathematics

“…Secondly, in other work I have defended a virtue approach to argument and, more narrowly, to deep disagreement. In particular, I have focussed on the vice of arrogance and the virtue of courage (Aberdein 2020(Aberdein , 2021a. Although other virtues and vices could profitably be discussed in this context, this choice was not arbitrary.…”

“…I have argued elsewhere that humility and courage can help to resolve deep disagreements, or at least, that the corresponding vices of arrogance and cowardice can make such resolutions harder to achieve (Aberdein 2020(Aberdein , 2021a. In part, this is because there are persuasive strategies that can help to resolve deadlocked arguments, but which are open to abuse.…”