What is Deep Disagreement?

Abstract

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.

Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

“…Feldman rejects the idea that framework propositions present any unusual difficulty for rational argumentation. This point of view is shared by several other authors who have explored in detail the question of whether there is a way to interpret framework propositions such that they present a compelling obstacle to rational argument (Lynch 2010;Siegel 2013;Pritchard 2018;Ranalli 2018bRanalli , 2018aSiegel 2019). This has led to useful insights into Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology as well as the status of fundamental epistemic principles.…”

The fundamental model of deep disagreements

“…Whereas a normal disagreement is limited to a specific area, exploring the conflict brings about a cluster of interrelated disputes in deep ones. Thus, when disagreeing about one issue, the parties soon realize that their dispute expands over related topics, in a kind of “ripple effect” (Ranalli 2018, 2). A common conjecture of the circumstances where deep disagreements germinate is that they arise when there is a clash of worldviews .…”

“…In his essay “What Is Deep Disagreement?” (2018) Ranalli talks about “two theories” of deep disagreements: the Wittgensteinian theory and the fundamental epistemic principle theory . In what follows, I discuss both “theories” in light of the two issues just mentioned: source and resolution.…”

Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

“…For a critical assessment of hinge epistemology in the context of deep disagreement, see Siegel (2021). 15 For varying interpretations of the problem, see Pryor (2013). For a formulation of the trilemma that is based on defeasibility, see Klein (2008, p. 485).…”

“…Page numbers refer to reprinted version in InformaI Logic 25(1), (2005), 3-11.12 Kusch (2021) contains an extensive discussion of Wittgensteinian approaches to deep disagreement.13 Ranalli (2021) distinguishes between a Wittgensteinian theory or hinge theory of disagreement and a fundamental epistemic principle theory.14 Wittgenstein (1969) and some Wittgensteinians argue that there are some fundamental propositions, so called hinge propositions, that we not only cannot rationally justify but which we cannot rationally assess at all. If we follow Wittgenstein, rational doubt about hinge-propositions is not only unmandated, it is simply impossible (See Pritchard 2016.)…”