The fundamental model of deep disagreements

Lavorerio, Victoria

doi:10.1111/meta.12500

Cited by 9 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…This means that, from A's perspective, revising their disputed belief would commit them to revising many of their other beliefs. This phenomenon is frequently noted in the literature (see de Ridder, 2021;Fogelin, 2005;Lavorerio, 2021;Ranalli, 2018). To see how this works, consider:…”

Section: Systematicity and Persistencementioning

confidence: 88%

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Ranalli

Lagewaard

2022

Philosophy Compass

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Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are 'deep disagreements'. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others.

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Section: Systematicity and Persistencementioning

confidence: 88%

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Ranalli

Lagewaard

2022

Philosophy Compass

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“…Scholars have provided slightly different conceptualizations of this unbridgeable difference-(for overviews, see Lavorerio, 2021a;Ranalli, 2021). Fogelin (2005) explained the unbridgeable difference as triggered by the clash between "underlying principles" (p. 5) or "framework propositions" (p. 14).…”

Section: Deep Disagreements and Why They Mattermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the metaphor of depth suggests incremental differences between disagreements, some being deeper than others, scholars typically ascribe to deep disagreements a qualitatively different status. In the case of a deep disagreement, the discussants work within different frameworks, or different perspectives, or perhaps different Kuhnian paradigms; they base their worldview on different fundamental principles, commitments, or concepts (for overviews, see Lavorerio, 2021aLavorerio, , 2021bRanalli, 2021). Let us look more closely into this claim.…”

Section: The Special Status Of Deep Disagreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Which of the scenarios is more likely to explain the complex debates mentioned in the literature on deep disagreements, debates on abortion, creationism, vaccination, liberalism, euthanasia, the existence of God and the like (Lavorerio, 2021a)? Clearly, the scenario where the disagreement persists, going from D to D 2 , from D 2 to D 3 , from D 3 to D 4 and so forth without any end in sight.…”

Section: First Thesis: All Disagreements Are Deepmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements

Popa

2022

Synthese

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Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal (‘shallow’) can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.

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“…Según Victoria Lavorerio (2021) existen dos teorías preponderantes que explican los desacuerdos profundos 7 : la teoría de los principios epistémicos fundamentales (PEF) y la teoría de las proposiciones bisagra. La primera explica los desacuerdos profundos a partir de la existencia de PEF que informan las posiciones contrarias en un desacuerdo profundo.…”

Section: Desacuerdos Profundosunclassified

Implicaciones Metafilosóficas De Los Desacuerdos Filosóficos Profundos

García

2022

cuaddefil

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En este artículo exploramos las consecuencias metafilosóficas de la existencia de desacuerdos profundos en filosofía. Argumentamos que los desacuerdos profundos filosóficos implican un desafío para la actividad filosófica, ya que los desacuerdos profundos filosóficos impiden dirimir racionalmente entre teorías filosóficas. Ello hace inútil exigir y ofrecer razones a favor de una u otra teoría filosófica. Para superar este escollo, argumentamos que la argumentación filosófica es un fin en sí mismo y no un medio para alcanzar la resolución racional de desacuerdos filosóficos profundos. Para llegar a estas conclusiones, describimos dos teorías que intentan explicar los desacuerdos profundos en general. Luego, construimos una distinción entre desacuerdo intrafilosófico e interfilosófico para calificar los desacuerdos profundos filosóficos. Así, los desacuerdos interfilosóficos son aquellos que son desacuerdos filosóficos profundos, mientras los intrafilosóficos son apenas desacuerdos entre pares epistémicos. Posteriormente, exploramos la estructura de los desacuerdos profundos filosóficos y concluimos que las razones epistémicas y prácticas fallan para dar respuesta racional a estos. Finalmente, respondemos a dos objeciones sobre la existencia del lenguaje argumentativo en los debates filosóficos y la imposibilidad de progreso filosófico.

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The fundamental model of deep disagreements

Cited by 9 publications

References 39 publications

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements

Implicaciones Metafilosóficas De Los Desacuerdos Filosóficos Profundos

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