On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements

Abstract

Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal (‘shallow’) can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.

Revisiting the Relationship between Arguing and Convincing: Towards a New Pragmatic Account

“…What happens when the Kekes-problem is encountered but there are no such facts? Does the present account fail in the case of deep disagreements (Popa 2022;Lavorerio 2021;Ranalli 2021)? As I have argued elsewhere, deep disagreements do not form a separate category of disagreements but rather occur whenever the Kekes-problem occurs (Popa 2022).…”

“…Does the present account fail in the case of deep disagreements (Popa 2022;Lavorerio 2021;Ranalli 2021)? As I have argued elsewhere, deep disagreements do not form a separate category of disagreements but rather occur whenever the Kekes-problem occurs (Popa 2022). It follows that our most complex and divisive social issues regarding constitutional rights, social problems, political issues, and moral dilemmas do not constitute a phenomenon qualitatively different from the versions of the Kekes-problem discussed here (e.g., where the Prover and the Skeptic cannot agree on the day of the week).…”

“…In fact, as Kekes points out, the parties are so far apart it hardly ever comes down to individuals engaging in an argumentative discussion. Epistemologists and argumentation theorists sometimes refer to this as deep disagreement (Popa 2022;Lavorerio 2021;Ranalli 2021). We thus have two problems related to the notion of convincing: there can be too much common ground (situation described by Kuhn) or too little (situation described by Kekes).…”

“…However, given that in Scenario 2 the Prover and the Skeptic do not share enough starting points to do anything else, then the stipulated distinction is rather unfortunate. Without any past joint commitments to reveal that the apparent disagreement was just a misunderstanding, the only way for the Prover and the Skeptic to do something about their disagreement is to try to tackle it through a new joint commitment regarding an outside intervention (see also Popa 2022). In fact, in the example where they disagree on what day of the week it is, the only rational approach is to create a new joint commitment that the dispute is to be decided by looking at the calendar.…”

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

“…See alsoGraham and Pederson (2020), who try to overcome the worry about entitlement hinge epistemology not being wedded to evidence.11 SeeRanalli (2018) for this objection and a reply. De Ridder (2021) develops a Fundamental Normative Principle theory in its place.12 However, seePopa (2022), who thinks that all disagreements are deep.…”