Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset

Salvatore, Jessica Di; Lundgren, Magnus; Oksamytna, Kseniya; Smidt, Hannah

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3703503

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 59 publications

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“…Our performance measures emphasize longitudinal shifts in performance within an observed leader’s tenure. Nevertheless, recognizing that missions experience different enabling and constraining circumstances, we account for missions’ mandates, which Di Salvatore et al (2020) show to have a considerable effect on peacekeeping outcomes. In particular, missions with a Chapter VII mandate are likely to have authorization for the use of force, thus making them riskier than other missions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping

Lundgren

Oksamytna

Bove

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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International organizations face a trade-off between the need to replace poorly performing leaders and the imperative of preserving the loyalty of influential or pivotal member states. This performance-politics dilemma is particularly acute in UN peacekeeping. Leaders of peacekeeping operations are responsible for ensuring that peacekeepers implement mandates, maintain discipline, and stay safe. Yet, if leaders fail to do so, is the UN Secretariat able and willing to replace them? We investigate newly collected data on the tenure of 238 civilian and military leaders in thirty-eight peacekeeping operations, 1978 to 2017. We find that the tenures of civilian leaders are insensitive to performance, but that military leaders in poorly performing missions are more likely to be replaced. We also find evidence that political considerations complicate the UN’s efforts at accountability. Holding mission performance constant, military leaders from countries that are powerful or contribute large numbers of troops stay longer in post.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping

Lundgren

Oksamytna

Bove

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?

Blair

Salvatore

Smidt

2021

American J Political Sci

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Under what conditions do UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) implement the tasks in their mandates? Contemporary PKOs are expected to fulfill increasingly fragmented mandates in active conflict zones. We argue that these two trends-increasingly fragmented mandates, increasingly implemented amidst violence-exacerbate delegation and coordination problems that hinder PKOs from pursuing mandated tasks, potentially undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of the Security Council, troop-contributing countries, and host governments. Combining new data sets on PKO activities and mandates in Africa (1998Africa ( -2016 and using instrumental variables and two-way fixed effects models, we find that mandate fragmentation is negatively correlated with mandate implementation, especially for peacebuilding tasks. Ongoing violence is also negatively correlated with implementation of peacebuilding tasks, but not with security tasks. We show that this is likely due to the offsetting effects of violence perpetrated by governments and rebels, as PKOs are better equipped to respond to the latter.

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