International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity

Abstract

One of the current controversies within international relations deals with the “stability” of bipolar as opposed to multipolar stratifications of world power. Morton Kaplan, in codifying the views of classical balance of power theorists, advances the view that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems. Kenneth Waltz, sagely pointing to the relatively peaceful international arena since World War II, argues that a bipolar distribution of power can guarantee world stability. Many a priori arguments have been presented to buttress the Kaplan and Waltz hypotheses. In one of the most elaborate such formulations, the “interaction opportunity” hypothesis of Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, the presence of stabilizing crosscutting alliances is postulated to be most likely within multipolar systems, which in turn are a function of the number of major powers and members of a system. In an attempt to bring the two opposing strands of theory into a larger framework, Richard Rosecrance more recently has suggested that bipolarity and multipolarity may each have their peculiar costs and benefits. Bipolarity, according to Rosecrance, is distinguished by (1) an absence of “peripheries,” such as areas for colonial expansion or neutral powers to woo; (2) all international behavior is highly politicized; (3) there are many crises; (4) changes in power confrontations are either significant or trivial, with no intervening shades of gray; (5) each pole is dominated by major powers highly motivated to expand their domains, willing even to incur brinksmanlike situations and hostility spirals; (6) no detente is possible. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is hypothesized to have (1) more interaction opportunities and thus less preoccupation (or obsession) with any one set of states; (2) fewer arms races; (3) more international conflicts; (4) the outcomes of international conflicts are harder to predict in advance; (5) changes in power confrontations have ambiguous consequences for the overall distribution of power. Rosecrance, therefore, urges a “bi-multipolar” arrangement that would combine the best features of both alternatives. The empirical questions and intriguing hypotheses so eloquently raised by Kaplan, Waltz, Deutsch, Singer, and Rosecrance have remained largely unexamined, however.

Polarity, Polarization, and the Transformation of Alliance Norms

“…A growing number of studies report findings that challenge the predictions of the theory in foreign economic policy (see Cowhey and Long 1983;Lawson 1983;McKeown 1983;Lake 1984;and Stein 1984). Similarly, while support can be found for the more general proposition that warfare is less prevalent when capabilities are highly concentrated in a unipolar system than when they are diffused in bipolar or multipolar systems (Haas 1970;Thompson 1986), Levy (1985) reports that unipolar periods are unstable. that privileged position.…”

Measuring Systemic Polarity

“…One might focus on (a) the similarities and dissimilarities in the UN voting records of each pair of nations (Alker, 1964;Alker and Russett, 1965); (b) the similarity or dissimilarity in each pair of nations' memberships in intergovernmental organizations (Wallace and Singer, 1970); (c) the degree to which pairs of nations trade with each other (Savage and Deutsch, 1960;Alker and Puchala, 1968); (d) the similarities in each pair of nations' alliance commitments (Singer and Small, 1968;Haas, 1970;Wallace, 1973); and so on.…”

“…The second set of attributes comprises the focus of studies concerned with the tightness or looseness of the system's poles (Kaplan, 1957;Deutsch and Singer, 1964;Singer and Small, 1968;Haas, 1970;Brody, 1963). Finally, studies that focus on the third set of attributes are primarily concerned with such notions as the balance of power or the preponderance of power (Gulick, 1955;Morgenthau, 1961;Organski, 1968; Bueno de Mesquita and Singer, 1973;Lucier, 1974).…”

Structural Realism and the Causes of War

“…Among the studies providing support for bipolar systems, those by Michael Haas (1970) and Ted Hopf (1991) are particularly revealing. Haas examines the capability distribution and the relative incidence of warfare in twenty-one geographic subsystems from the eighteenth century onward.…”

“…His results are typical of many subsequent studies: "If a state or group of states is willing to accept long wars that are won by aggressor states, bipolarity provides an escape from the more war-prone character of historical multipolar subsystems. Multipolarity entails more violence, more countries at war, and more casualties; bipolarity brings fewer but longer wars" (Haas, 1970:99-100, 121). Hopf (1991:478-479, 486) assesses bipolarity and multipolarity in a very different setting.…”