2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.10.015
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International returnees as outside directors: A catalyst for strategic adaptation under institutional pressure

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Cited by 33 publications
(28 citation statements)
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References 78 publications
(84 reference statements)
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“…Such a finding allows deducing that if institutional investors make an attempt to assess the director in terms of strategic control, this procedure would motivate them to increasingly venture to support even more questionable situations. This result turns out to be consistent with those documented by the studies elaborated by Lee and Roberts (2015) and Lacoste et al (2009). According to Table 5, the FAM variable regression coefficient sounds to have a negative and insignificant value at the threshold of 10% compared with the dependent variable (a = −0.003 and p is greater than 10%).…”
Section: Multivaried Analysissupporting
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Such a finding allows deducing that if institutional investors make an attempt to assess the director in terms of strategic control, this procedure would motivate them to increasingly venture to support even more questionable situations. This result turns out to be consistent with those documented by the studies elaborated by Lee and Roberts (2015) and Lacoste et al (2009). According to Table 5, the FAM variable regression coefficient sounds to have a negative and insignificant value at the threshold of 10% compared with the dependent variable (a = −0.003 and p is greater than 10%).…”
Section: Multivaried Analysissupporting
confidence: 93%
“…Choi, Sun, Zhang & Grandjean, 2012;Dahlquist & Robertson, 2001;Kang & Stulz, 1997). Concerning the micro and macro level changes, Ahmadjian and Robbins have argued that, in the 1990s, foreign institutional investors led Japanese companies to adopt massive restructuring, and even started to jeopardize a firmly established tradition undertaken by stakeholding parties, capitalism in the country (Lee & Roberts, 2015). All this leads to formulate the following hypothesis:…”
Section: Presence Of Institutional Investor Control Blocksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutional directors are receiving attention from academic researchers (Baums, Buxbaum, & Hopt, ; Bhojraj & Sengupta, ; Black, ; Gillan & Starks, ) due to the monitoring role they play while sitting on boards, their active behaviour in response to the corporate governance problems of firms (Brickley, Lease, & Smith Jr., ; Pucheta‐Martínez & López‐Zamora, ) and their capacity as disciplinary managers (Lee & Roberts, ). Furthermore, Lee and Roberts () argue that such directors have many incentives “to prefer firms with better corporate governance mechanisms.” Thus, it is logical to consider that firms with institutional directors on boards will be more likely to be transparent and encourage CSR reporting, as the costs associated with their monitoring role will be lower in responsible companies. This argument is supported by previous research (Charitou, Louca, & Panayides, ; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, & Yan, ; Wan‐Hussin, ), which shows that institutional directors raise corporate transparency and reduce fraudulent accounting practices, inter alia.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, the literature on board internationalization suggests that foreign directors improve board monitoring by contributing independent thinking, raising controversial issues, and consequently reducing managerial entrenchment (Masulis et al, 2012;Ruigrok et al, 2007;Van Veen et al, 2014). Empirical evidence supporting this argument shows that the presence of outsider Anglo-American board membership enhances the market value of listed firms (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003), and international returnees as outside directors reinforce corporate restructuring efforts (Lee and Roberts, 2014). Extending this argument to the context of MNEs, when headquarters country nationals are present on the board of a local implementer subsidiary, they are likely to be independent and have the requisite power and incentives to control the subsidiary management.…”
Section: Subsidiary Strategy Headquarters Country Directors and Thementioning
confidence: 99%