This paper sets out to enquire the nature of constituents' participation in the IASB's due process in terms of representation (constituents' diversity and characteristics) and drivers to participate. We choose to adopt a multi-issue/multi-period approach to investigate constituents' formal participation. An analysis of comment letters sent directly to the IASB over the period 2002-2006, reveals that preparers sent most letters followed by the accounting profession and standard setters. With regard to timing, we find that preparers concentrate their participation efforts at a later stage in the process compared to the other constituents, who react earlier. Formal indirect participation in the IASB's due process by submitting comments letters to EFRAG is infrequently used by European constituents. In those cases where constituents exert influence to both IASB and EFRAG, they often use exactly the same comment letter. Concentrating on the drivers to participate, the data reveal that preparers, accountants and standard setters react significantly more when proposals have a major impact on the accounting numbers of a company. Users, stock exchanges and their supervisory authorities write significantly more comment letters when disclosure issues are at stake. Finally, participating preparers in the IASB's due process are larger and more profitable than non-participating preparers.

This article analyzes the impact of not controlling for “demographic sample” differences on research results in the area of comparative family/nonfamily business research. Using different statistical methods with and without control for “demographic sample” differences, the results show that controlling for these firm demographics in a bivariate as well as a multivariate framework is very important to discover “real” differences between family and nonfamily firms. We found “real” differences for export, budgeting, variable reward systems, profitability and gender, educational degree, and tenure of the CEO. Strategy, networking, long‐term planning and control systems, perceived environmental uncertainty, growth, and management training, classified by prior empirical research as different between family and nonfamily firms, do not differ.

To understand the design and use of management control systems (MCSs) in tax compliant multinational enterprises (MNE), an in-depth case study was undertaken. The selected MNE chose to use the same transfer prices for tax compliance and internal management purposes. We argue that modifications in the MCS cannot be understood without an appreciation of the corporate approach towards fiscal transfer pricing compliance.Over a sustained period of time, the effect on organising, planning , evaluation and reward controls are traced suggesting a more coercive use of the MCS. Three propositions are offered to guide future research in this complex area.

Based on a sample of 425 SMEs, we investigate whether intergenerational differences affect the capital structure and growth behavior of family firms. We integrate the financing and growth relation into our research by using a 2SLS approach and the internal and sustainable growth concepts. Evidence is found that the capital structure is not directly influenced by the managing generation, but indirectly through the realized growth rate. Moreover, results indicate that next-generation companies grow slower because they have the tendency to forego part of their growth rather than risk the loss of family control due to the increased use of debt.

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Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines the effect of an earnings-based listing regulation on corporate financial reporting management. In 2001, China revised its listing standards requiring compulsory stock suspension for firms reporting three-year consecutive losses. Suspended stocks are further delisted if they continue to report losses in the year of stock suspension. Research Findings/Insights: Our results show that firms approaching the delisting procedure use more earnings management, although the effect is minor. Meanwhile, we observe that delisting risk induces extensive performance-enhancing asset restructuring activities. For firms turning losses into profits, our evidence suggests a negative relationship between earnings management and asset restructuring. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study extends the earnings management literature by suggesting that earnings management to avoid losses is likely to increase with the severity of the losses and decline with asset restructuring activities. In addition, this research adds to the literature on the economic consequences of the delisting process. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study provides evidence that an earnings-based delisting regulation is a doubleedged sword which leads to either earnings management or performance-enhancing asset restructuring activities. By pointing out the earnings management and restructuring effects of the Chinese delisting regime, we may inform policy makers of the economic consequences of an earnings-based regime. This adds to prior evidence on the effects of marketbased delisting thresholds. In addition, the study highlights that the earnings-based delisting regulation does not create a level playing field, since state-controlled firms are at an advantage to use more government-led asset restructurings through state-owned shareholders in order to avoid delisting.

The paper analyzes the effects of privatization on the performance of firms switching their ownership from state-owned to private-owned ownership. By using difference-indifference with control variables and propensity score matching techniques, this study overcomes some shortcomings in previous studies on the effect of privatization on performance in transition economies such as no control of selection bias and the inadequateness to single out the privatization effect from the concurrent effects of other economic factors. We find that a shift from state or collective ownership to private ownership can consistently enhance the performance of switchers in terms of profitability. This suggests that privatization is an efficient way to improve the financial performance of Vietnamese state-owned enterprises.

Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study examines whether certain proxies for board incentives and board capital are linked with bankruptcy in unlisted firms. Research Findings/Insights Based on data analyzed over a five‐year period with a sample of 232 matched pairs of unlisted firms, results reveal that firms with boards led by an independent Board Chair (vs. CEO duality), and including longer‐tenured directors, and directors with fewer additional directorships on average, are less likely to become bankrupt. Results of analyses of board size and board change support a “reputation” hypothesis, i.e. that directors begin to flee firms in a downward spiral prior to bankruptcy. Theoretical/Academic Implications Results support an eclectic model of board incentives and board capital, which integrates elements of agency and resource dependence theories, and the group decision‐making literature to explain governance antecedents of firms that went bankrupt. It builds on a model proposed by Hillman and Dalziel, while identifying important differences, including lack of support for predicted moderating effects between board incentives and board capital. Findings also support applicability of the threat‐rigidity logic and reputation hypothesis in this context, and the importance of anchoring corporate governance research more precisely on prediction of certain levels of performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications Findings support governance recommendations to separate Board Chair and CEO leadership and limit a director's number of outside directorships. Negative effects of director tenure on bankruptcy contradict the notion of “term limits,” suggesting that benefits of firm‐specific knowledge and experience may outweigh risks of entrenchment.