International management of North Atlantic pelagic fisheries – The role of competing species and exploiters

Salenius, Fredrik

doi:10.1016/j.fishres.2017.08.001

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…-How cooperation in internationally shared fish stocks can be supported by implic it or explicit threat strategies (Hannesson, 2017); -The effect of multispecies fisheries management in an international fishery (Górniewicz and Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2017;Salenius, 2017); -The role of the age structure of the stock in the strategic interactions between harvesting countries (Gauteplass and Skonhoft, 2017); -How the formation of international fisheries agreements is impacted when nonconsumptive values of the fish stock are accounted for (Pintassilgo et al, 2017); -The strategic interaction between fishing agents in a context of uncertainty (Engwerda, 2017;Punt, 2017); -A framework to study competition, cooperation and bargaining options in fisher ies under financial and technological constraints (Mullon and Mullon, 2017); -The role of auctions in rights based fisheries (Marszalec, 2017).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The management of internationally shared fish stocks in the Northeast Atlantic is also the research topic of Salenius (2017). The paper studies the joint effects of the interactions between harvesting countries and fish stocks, in the context of a multispec ies fishery composed by three pelagic species: Norwegian spring-spawning herring, mackerel and blue whiting.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game theory and fisheries

Kronbak¹,

Lindroos²,

Munro³

et al. 2018

Fisheries Research

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Game theory studies the strategic interactions between and among decision makers, players, through mathematical models called games. This paper presents an overview on the evolution of the application of game theory to fisheries economics. The first applications emerged in the late 1970s, focussing upon internationally shared fish stocks. This occurred in the context of the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. During the 1980s and early 1990s the application of game theory to fisheries focused mainly on transboundary fish stocks. Thereafter, the applications to straddling fish stocks developed significantly, through the use of coalition games. This was as a consequence of the mismanagement of these stocks, and the management regime brought forth in response by 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The application of game theory to the management of national/regional fisheries is a new research frontier, as it is still much underexplored, when compared to internatio na l fisheries. This paper also summarizes the main research developments of a set of nine papers selected for this special issue on Game Theory and Fisheries.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Game theory and fisheries

Kronbak¹,

Lindroos²,

Munro³

et al. 2018

Fisheries Research

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show abstract

“…Multispecies analysis is another important area of further investigation. In this context, an interesting result comes from the recent study by Salenius [122]. In applying game theory to a problem of interaction between different fishing countries and stocks, he arrived at the conclusion that in a situation of non-cooperative management, the difference between single and multi-species fisheries is not very important.…”

Section: Future Impacts: Roots For Further Investigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Searching for a New Model of Governance in the High Seas: Game Theory Applied to International Commons Management

Coelho

Filipe

2021

Mathematics

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In the last decade, the United Nations took important steps for the creation of a new instrument for biodiversity protection in areas beyond national jurisdiction. This put under discussion the central issues of international commons management and of the governance model for the High Seas. The aim of this paper is to discuss and evaluate critically the political negotiations already made and yet to come, as well as their rationale. For this purpose, the paper applies game theory to fisheries management to get insights. This research aims to contribute toward more qualified and grounded decisions. The key role of cooperation in the sustainable use of common resources is stressed.

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“…This paradox presents a dilemma for stakeholders in social-ecological systems: how to deal with cheaters? In fisheries, independent of the scale, this dilemma waylays fishers, decision-makers, researchers, and all of those concerned about building a sustainable way to fish [ 7 , 8 ]. Cooperative behaviour in this complex conflict, can be explored through evolutionary game theory to discern tendencies or produce predictions concerning each agent's choices [ 9 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries

2020

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Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery.

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International management of North Atlantic pelagic fisheries – The role of competing species and exploiters

Cited by 9 publications

References 22 publications

Game theory and fisheries

Game theory and fisheries

Searching for a New Model of Governance in the High Seas: Game Theory Applied to International Commons Management

Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries

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