International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

Abstract

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A 'remoteness effect' is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons. KEYWORDS biodiversity conservation, coalition formation, spatial structure of cooperation, international environmental agreements RÉSUMÉLa coopération internationale en matière de la conservation de la biodiversité à l'heure où les structures spatiales importent. Spatial Economic Analysis. Cet article considère la stabilité des accords internationaux sur l'environnement en faveur de la conservation de la biodiversité où la structure spatiale est très évidente. On étudie l'impact de la distance entre les pays sur la stabilité de la coalition. On analyse une structure spatiale circulaire à partir des configurations spatiales différentes. On obtient des résultats solides pour une grande série de paramètres coûts-bénéfices: la taille maximale des coalitions stables est de deux. On réalise la meilleure récompense au moment où les coalitions sont composées de pays limitrophes et dont la distance est à son minimum. Un 'effet isolement' est à noter, c'est-à-dire certaines coalitions comportant deux membres sont instables quand l'un des pays signataires est situé loin de l'autre membre de la coalition et des pays agissant à titre individuel.MOTS-CLÉS conservation de la biodiversité, établissement d'une coalition, structure spatiale de la coopération, accords environnementaux internationaux RESUMEN Cooperación internacional para la conservación de la biodiversidad cuando las estructuras espaciales son importantes. Spatial Economic Analysis. En este artículo consideramos la estabilidad de los acuerdos internacionales sobre el medio ambiente para la conservación de la biodiversidad con una estructura espacial explícita. Estudiamos el impacto de la distancia entre los países en lo que respecta a la estabilidad de las coaliciones. Analizamos una estructura espacial de tipo circular con diferentes patrones espaciales. Obtenemos resultados sólidos para una amplia gama de parámetros de costes y beneficios: las coaliciones estables tienen un tamaño máximo de dos miembros. Los mejores beneficios globales se obtienen cuando las coaliciones están compuestas por países vecinos con la menor distancia posible. Observamos un 'efecto de distancia', es decir, algunas coaliciones de do...

The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go

“…. , k s ) of positive integers such that k 1 ≥ k 2 ≥ · · · ≥ k s and k 1 + · · · + k s = n. 11 We denote the set of partitions of N by C N and refer to a partition of N also as coalition structure. This last notion is used in order to define now below the notion of congruent "coalition structures."…”

“…10 For example, there are 5 partitions of {1, 2, 3}: {{1}, {2}, {3}}, {{1}, {2, 3}}, {{2}, {1, 3}}, {{3}, {1, 2}}, and {{1, 2, 3}}. 11 For example, there are 11 partitions of 6: (6), (5, 1), (4, 2), (4, 1, 1), (3, 3), (3, 2, 1), (3, 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1, 1, 1), and (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). The number p n of partitions of n is a rapidly increasing function of n. For example, p 1 = 1, p 4 = 5, p 9 = 30, p 50 = 204226, p 200 = 3972999029388.…”

“…2. We use (11). Definition 6(a) together with t(0) = ∞ to imply that m withŜ(m) ≥ 1 is weakly internally stable if and only if t(s) ≥ 0.…”

“…3 For cartel games (see below), one may also look for so-called "semi-strict Nash equilibria." 4 Recent applications address, e.g., agriculture [10], biodiversity conservation [11], and vaccination [12]. For further ideas for possible extensions of the model, see [13].…”

Novel Index for bioclimatic zone-based biodiversity conservation strategies under climate change in Northeast Asia

“…However, many habitats, particularly those dependent on cool and humid climates, are expected to shrink and in some cases completely disappear, which could lead to a decrease in biodiversity [11][12][13]. In response, there has been an increasing effort to halt, and eventually reverse, the loss of biodiversity through international cooperation [14,15].…”