Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment
of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules

Zavalloni, Matteo; Raggi, Meri; Viaggi, Davide

doi:10.1007/s10640-018-0237-9

Cited by 26 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The reason is that local governments would deregulate agricultural non-point source pollution control and connive their polluting behavior of agricultural production to gain more local economic profits [16]. Furthermore, agricultural ecological environmental resources belong to the public goods [17], while agricultural non-point source pollution control has a typical positive externality. As such, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers' environmental consumption behavior (e.g., discharge of pollution, improper use of modern means in agricultural production, etc.)…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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“…Nonetheless, research results show that priority mechanisms or selection criteria implemented by local administrators have had no effect in determining a desirable spatial distribution of participation in organic farming. To enhance participation in a targeted area, it might be useful to develop collective participation, so as to improve networking and social capital and information flows among farmers [45].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second mechanism relates to the possibility of exploiting territorial features as a part of new business opportunities [41]. This is the case when there are different demand levels for ecosystem services [44] linked to landscape or location in peri-urban areas [45].…”

Section: Data Usedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the Spatial Agglomeration of Participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes: The Case of the Tuscany Region

Bartolini

Vergamini

2019

Sustainability

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Agri-environmental schemes (AESs) constitute one of the main agricultural policy instruments that address environmental objectives in the Common Agricultural Policy. However, in spite of a 20-year application window and large budgetary shares allocated by EU member states, several studies demonstrate lower-than-expected environmental impacts. The reasons for poor environmental outcomes are the lack of targeting, low participation rates, spatial heterogeneity, and information asymmetry between farmers and public administrators. This study comprehensively analyses the determinants of AES adoption while highlighting patterns of the spatial agglomeration of participation in organic and integrated production. For this, we combine the results of farm-level adoption analysis with a spatial analysis of the participation rate. The results show that both micro- and meso-level characteristics strongly impact AES participation. In fact, farm and household structure, quality of extension services, and territorial conditions all significantly affect AES adoption.

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“…This type of support differs from earlier papers that have considered support in CPR games. The way we model support does not require an outside agency that subsidizes the coalition as in Ansink and Bouma (2013) and Zavalloni, Raggi, and Viaggi (2019) or has agenda-setting power as in Ansink, Weikard, and Withagen (2019). 1 It also does not require commitment as in Long and Flaaten (2011) who consider supporting transfers by the coalition members to compensate singletons for joining the coalition.…”

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confidence: 99%

Common pool resources with support

Ansink

Weikard

2019

Natural Resource Modeling

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Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules

Cited by 26 publications

References 31 publications

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Understanding the Spatial Agglomeration of Participation in Agri-Environmental Schemes: The Case of the Tuscany Region

Common pool resources with support

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