Interesse e a superação do learnification para a prática filosófica

Abstract

O presente texto discute o conceito de interesse e a crítica, feita por Gert Biesta, ao fenômeno “learnification” da educação como base para a prática filosófica no contexto do ensino de filosofia. O problema do texto está assim formulado: qual a importância do interesse e da crítica contida no conceito del learnification, circunscritos a partir de John Dewey e Gert Biesta, para a prática filosófica que possa consolidar o ensino de filosofia? Se a filosofia reivindica a atitude filosófica do professor, esta atitude parece reivindicar, igualmente, o interesse, a partir de uma nova visão sobre a educação que não se restrinja à aprendizagem como base fundamental para a prática filosófica.

Teorias da democracia em John Dewey: exigências formativas da cooperação social

“…The heart of the problem has been reached once by understanding the notion of democracy as a moral principle that requires understanding human action itself. In this matter, as well as many others, Dewey is directly influenced by his friend and colleague of the University of Chicago, Georg Herbert Mead (1992), mainly in two aspects. First, the significant symbol is as mediating dimension of the formation of the Self; second, and derived from the first one, there is the intersubjectivity as the main force driving the social bond that connects human beings.…”

“…First, the significant symbol is as mediating dimension of the formation of the Self; second, and derived from the first one, there is the intersubjectivity as the main force driving the social bond that connects human beings. In synthesis, the action symbolically mediated is the main formative impulse of local communitarian experiences, and in a broader sense, of the very democratic formation of the public scene (Mead, 1992).…”