Integrating Investigation and Prevention

Abstract

The British scientist Lord Kelvin once asserted that if something can be measured, it can be understood. To the extent that this is true, social scientists who want to understand political corruption or police misconduct would seem to be in big trouble, for some fairly obvious reasons. Corruption and misconduct by their nature usually involve prohibited actions committed by consenting adults in private, the offenders sometimes occupy positions of considerable power, any victim is often as compromised as the offenders or (especially in the case of an organisation) is unaware of being victimised, and whistleblowers historically have got such a raw deal from their departments and from the authorities that only the most heroic have persevered with their claims. No doubt its covert nature and reach into the upper echelons of power are reasons why there is still debate about how much corruption there really was in Queensland prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and why there is continuing controversy about whether the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), set up in late 1989 to continue the work of the Inquiry, has been a success or a failure.

Curtailing the code of silence among the South African police

“…Shortly after these scandals, however, the ANC-led government suspended the head of the NPA on grounds of incompetence and started disbanding the Scorpions, the NPA's elite investigative unit ( Joubert et al, 2008). This political, knee-jerk reaction is, in accordance with Homel (1997), predictive of the work of such investigative units. He suggests that despite these units being independent from the executive government, they become "unavoidably enmeshed in intense political controversy" and subsequently, "the target of bitter political attack" (p. 40).…”

Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective

“…The trigger of these attacks was a decision by the CJC to begin an inquiry, led by Kenneth Carruthers QC, regarding a secret memorandum of understanding between the police union, the police minister, and the Premier while he was still in the opposition (Lewis). The allegation revolved around an attempt by the police union to extract significant concessions from the two politicians in the management of the police force, in return for the police union's political support during the crucial by-election in January 1996 (Homel 1997a). The CJC investigation allowed for the possibility that the political executives may have been guilty of misconduct, which in turn, politicians interpreted as a "witch hunt" against those who were party to signing the secret memorandum with the union.…”