Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This article addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate. Against this background, two hypotheses are investigated: (i) the striking outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation, and (ii) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both institutions and media accessibility: the more centralized and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales.)

Citizens' engagement on local governments' Facebook sites. An empirical analysis: The impact of different media and content types in Western Europe

“…For example, the Obama Administration has several sites (web and SM) for tracking government spending and making it visible to a wide public (http://www.recovery.gov). Some studies have found that transparency and accountability decrease corruption (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009;Maor, 2004). But some studies also indicate that e-transparency can have a heterogeneous effect on different dimensions of trust (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009) and that the impact of transparency on citizens' trust in government depends on the cultural context of the country (Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013).…”

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between e-government and Corruption

“…As Tanzi (1998) describes, privatization can create its own conditions to enable corruption, through payment of commissions to get access to markets and insider information not available to others that promote corruption in response to market competition. Maor (2004) investigates two hypotheses related to transparency and accountability by a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales). First, he examines corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges) and hypothesizes that the outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation, and second, the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both institutions and media accessibility: the more centralized and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation.…”

Relationship-Oriented Cultures, Corruption, and International Marketing Success

“…' Aidt (2003, p. 632) concurs, ''Corruption is a many-faceted phenomenon and it is hard to give a precise and comprehensive definition…yet it is important to try.'' Much research has also been done on the determinants of corruption (Aidt, 2003;Davis and Ruhe, 2003;Sanyal, 2005), the consequences of corruption (Aidt, 2003;Alam, 1995;Maor, 2004;Wei and Shleifer, 2000;Winters, 2004), and ways to combat corruption (Ali and Isse, 2003;Brademas and Heimann, 1998;Husted, 1999). It is no wonder that corruption has topped the research agenda of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations.…”