Institutional Control of Redistricting and the Geography of Representation

Edwards, Barry; Crespin, Michael H.; Williamson, Ryan D.; Palmer, Maxwell

doi:10.1086/690633

Cited by 38 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In fact, in most scenarios, the state legislators themselves are tasked with creating their own maps (Butler and Cain 1992; McDonald 2004), and sometimes they take the lead in determining the boundaries of the very same districts in which they vie for reelection. More recently, commissions and the courts (McKenzie 2012) have played an influential role in the redistricting process of several states (Carson and Crespin 2004; Edwards et al 2017), but no seasoned political observer would contend that electoral districts in the United States have ever been engineered and implemented behind a veil of ignorance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black Representation

Hicks

Klarner

McKee

et al. 2017

Political Research Quarterly

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What is the minimum black population necessary to elect African-American state lawmakers? We offer the most comprehensive examination of the election of black state legislators in the post- Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) era. We begin by charting changes in the partisan affiliation of state legislators and the percentage of black legislators from 1971 to 2016. This descriptive assessment is undertaken according to important regional (Non-South and South) and subregional (Rim South and Deep South) contexts in American politics. We then perform multivariate analyses of the likelihood of electing black legislators across three periods following the marked increase in the creation of majority-minority districts (1993–1995, 2003–2005, 2013–2015). Because of sectional variation in the partisan strength of the major parties, the probability of achieving black representation is significantly different depending upon whether a contest occurs in the Non-South, Rim South, or Deep South, with the latter constituting of the highest threshold of black population necessary to elect an African-American. By merging an original dataset on state legislative elections with the most complete evaluation of the factors shaping the election of black lawmakers, our findings shed new light on minority representation and how sectional differences greatly affect the electoral success of African-Americans.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black Representation

Hicks

Klarner

McKee

et al. 2017

Political Research Quarterly

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“…This case is noteworthy for several reasons. First, a court redrew the map (Pennsylvania Supreme Court), not partisan line drawers, which means partisan objectives were arguably a secondary consideration (Edwards et al 2017). 2 However, by altering a Republican gerrymander, the net effects necessarily redounded to Democrats' benefit.…”

Section: Tamping Down the Electorally Disruptive Effects Of Redistrictingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pennsylvania in 2018: How Redistricting Does and Doesn’t Make a Difference

Hicks

McKee

2021

State and Local Government Review

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In this Field Note, we use precinct- and individual-level data on Pennsylvania to assess whether congressional redistricting influenced voter preferences in the 2018 midterm. Despite redistricting vastly altering the distribution of voters in House districts, this did little to change their preferences. Rather, redistricting contributed to Democratic House gains primarily by configuring a handful of districts to be more favorable to the Democratic Party. The evidence for minimal direct effects of redistricting on voter preferences, despite the presence of national political conditions breaking strongly in favor of Democrats, speaks to the increasing nationalization of American elections and with it, a concomitant decline in the incumbency advantage.

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“…Second, even though gerrymandering was severely distorting the democratic system, as a recent study by Edwards et al. (: 1) shows, citizens are capable of creating sophisticated and fair electoral boundaries. Of course, this is not a perfect case.…”

Section: Parties and Mini‐publics: A Division Of Labour In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…But, overall, the CCRC and other independent citizen redistricting commissions have been successful in crafting new borders in ways that undercut party gerrymandering and improve upon legislative efforts (Edwards et al. ). While we cannot generalise too much, this case shows that authoritative and decoupled mini‐publics can be used to help reorient democratic systems in productive ways, even in highly problematic circumstances.…”

Section: Parties and Mini‐publics: A Division Of Labour In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Complementing and correcting representative institutions: When and how to use mini‐publics

Kuyper

Wolkenstein

2018

European J Political Res

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In democratic theory and practice, it has become a popular view that designed deliberative mini‐publics can effectively counteract failures of representative democratic institutions. But when should mini‐publics be deployed, and how should they be designed? This article develops a framework for thinking about these questions. It argues that when representative democratic institutions ensure the empowerment of inclusions, enable the formation of collective agendas and wills, and are capable of translating those agendas into binding decisions, mini‐publics should be used sparingly and as complementary initiatives; the less representative institutions are able to serve these functions, the more mini‐publics should gain independence and standing to correct these problems. The article shows how this can be operationalised in light of two key institutional design issues – coupling and authority – and discusses some empirical examples that foreground the empirical leverage offered by the suggested framework.

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Institutional Control of Redistricting and the Geography of Representation

Cited by 38 publications

References 9 publications

Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black Representation

Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black Representation

Pennsylvania in 2018: How Redistricting Does and Doesn’t Make a Difference

Complementing and correcting representative institutions: When and how to use mini‐publics

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