Together now!' was the slogan used in the invitation to the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA), an initiative launched on the second day of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakesh in November 2016. During this event, the two high-level champions nominated by COP as an outcome of the Paris Agreementthe French Ambassador in charge of climate negotiations Laurence Tubiana and the Moroccan Minister of Environment Hakima El Haitécalled upon businesses, regions, cities, industries and NGOs to showcase their climate activities and partner with states in the transition to the low carbon society. The champions' effort to mobilize non-state climate action pre-2020 coincides with the launch during the last week of COP 22 of the 2050 Pathway Platform. Informed by the same cooperative spirit, this multi-stakeholder initiative rests upon a broad coalition among 15 cities, 22 states and 200 companies seeking to devise long-term, net zero, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways. 1 These efforts to accelerate climate action by facilitating dialogue, knowledge exchange and cooperation among state and non-state actors intensify a trend in global climate politics: rapprochement of the realms of multilateral diplomacy and transnational climate action with the rationale to enhance the pre-2020 ambition. Officially, this process was set in motion during the 'Action Day' of COP 20 in Lima in 2014, when the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) were launched to 'galvanize the groundswell of actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, businesses and civil society organizations' (Chan et al. 2015, p. 467). However, in practice, this "widened frame" for climate diplomacy' (Christoff 2016, p. 770) has a much longer history and reflects the growth and impact of transnational private actors, NGOs, social movement and transnational advocacy networks in world politics (Hoffmann 2011). Ever since the UNFCCC was signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it has formed a veritable center of gravity for a multiplicity

Is orchestration democratically legitimate? The importance of this question is signaled by recent theoretical and empirical developments of international organizations. On one hand, debates concerning the legitimacy and democratic deficits of international politics continue unabated. On the other, the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has progressively engaged in processes of orchestration culminating in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scholarship on orchestration has almost exclusively focused on how to ensure effectiveness while excluding normative questions. This lacuna is addressed by arguing that orchestration should be assessed according to its democratic credentials. The promises and pitfalls of orchestration can be usefully analyzed by applying a set of democratic values: participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency. Two major orchestration efforts by the UNFCCC both pre-and post-Paris are shown to have substantive democratic shortfalls, not least with regard to participation and accountability. Ways of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of orchestration are identified.

This article explores the relationship between non-electoral representatives and democratic legitimacy by combining the recent constructivist turn in political representation with systemic work in deliberative theory. Two core arguments are advanced. First, non-electoral representatives should be judged by their position in a wider democratic system. Second, deliberative democracy offers a productive toolkit by which to evaluate these agents. I develop a framework of systemic representation which depicts the elemental parts of a democratic system and assigns normative standards according to the space occupied. The framework gives priority of democratic analysis to the systemic level. This helps mitigate a central concern in the constructivist turn which suggests that representatives mobilize constituencies in ways that are susceptible to framing and manipulation. I engage in case-study analysis of the collapsed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to unpack the different spaces occupied by non-electoral representative and elucidate the varied democratic demands that hinge on this positioning.

In this article, we outline the multifaceted roles played by non-state actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and place this within the wider landscape of global climate governance. In doing so, we look at both the formation and aftermath of the 2015 Paris Agreement. We argue that the Paris Agreement cements an architecture of hybrid multilateralism that enables and constrains non-state actor participation in global climate governance. We flesh out the constitutive features of hybrid multilateralism, enumerate the multiple positions non-state actors may employ under these conditions, and contend that non-state actors will play an increasingly important role in the post-Paris era. To substantiate these claims, we assess these shifts and ask how non-state actors may affect the legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. How to cite this article:WIREs Clim Change 2018, 9:e497. doi: 10.1002/wcc.497 INTRODUCTIONT he Paris Agreement now stands at the center of efforts by the international community to address the threats associated with climatic change. Within this Agreement-built upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)-non-state actors will play an increasingly important role. The presence and prominence of non-state actors within the Paris Agreement mirrors a broader shift across the international climate governance landscape in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business groups, think tanks, trade unions, private governance arrangements, transnational networks, and substate authorities assume active roles in limiting the negative effects of global warming. 1,2 This conceptualization of non-state actors includes civil society, business, research groups, and substate authorities. We prefer this expansive definition as it fits alongside the definition of nonparty stakeholders employed by the UNFCCC (see also Ref 3).In this article, we focus on how the Paris Agreement further deepens and complicates the connections between multilateralism and non-state action. It does so by creating an architecture that we call 'hybrid multilateralism' that splices together state and nonstate actors (on the usage of this term, see traits: state-led action defined and stipulated by the parties through their own nationally determined contributions (NDCs) as well as efforts by the UNFCCC to orchestrate transnational climate efforts. In both instances, non-state actors are formally and informally woven into the Paris Agreement performing a range of different and increasingly important functions. Non-state actors will act as watchdogs of the NDCs enhancing transparency, facilitating the stocktakes, and pressuring for the ratcheting up of NDCs every 5 years. Likewise non-state actors will act as contributors and governing partners through orchestration as they are encouraged by the Agreement 'to scale up their climate actions, and [register] those actions in the Non-State A...

This article takes stock of the evolution of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) through the prism of three recent shifts: the move away from targeting industrial country emissions in a legally binding manner under the Kyoto Protocol to mandating voluntary contributions from all countries under the Paris Agreement; the shift from the top-down Kyoto architecture to the hybrid Paris outcome; and the broadening out from a mitigation focus under Kyoto to a triple goal comprising mitigation, adaptation, and finance under Paris. This review discusses the implications of these processes for the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the UNFCCC's institutional and operational settings for meeting the convention's objectives. It ends by sketching three potential scenarios facing the UNFCCC as it seeks to coordinate the Paris Agreement and its relationship to the wider landscape of global climate action.

In democratic theory and practice, it has become a popular view that designed deliberative mini‐publics can effectively counteract failures of representative democratic institutions. But when should mini‐publics be deployed, and how should they be designed? This article develops a framework for thinking about these questions. It argues that when representative democratic institutions ensure the empowerment of inclusions, enable the formation of collective agendas and wills, and are capable of translating those agendas into binding decisions, mini‐publics should be used sparingly and as complementary initiatives; the less representative institutions are able to serve these functions, the more mini‐publics should gain independence and standing to correct these problems. The article shows how this can be operationalised in light of two key institutional design issues – coupling and authority – and discusses some empirical examples that foreground the empirical leverage offered by the suggested framework.

How can democracy best be pursued and promoted in the existing global system? In this article, I propose a novel suggestion: democratization should occur at the level of international regime complexity. Because each issue-area of world politics is distinct, we require tailor-made (as opposed to one-size-fits-all) responses to the global democratic deficit. I conceptualize global democracy as an ongoing process of democratization in which a set of core normative values are more or less satisfied. I explicate equal participation, accountability, and institutional revisability as those key standards. I argue that the democratization of regime complexes should occur across two distinct planes: (1) the realm of multilateral negotiations; and (2) institutional forms of democratic experimentalism between rule-makers and rule-takers. I evaluate and defend the potential of this argument by analyzing the intellectual property rights regime complex. Because intellectual property rights represent a 'tough case' for global democrats, we should be optimistic about the democratization of alternative regime complexes.

Though commanding a prominent role in political theory, deliberative democracy has also become a mainstay of myriad other research traditions in recent years. This diffusion has been propelled along by the notion that deliberation, properly conceived and enacted, generates many beneficial outcomes. This article has three goals geared toward understanding whether these instrumental benefits provide us with good reasons-beyond intrinsic ones-to be deliberative democrats. First, the proclaimed instrumental benefits are systematized in terms of micro, meso, and macro outcomes. Second, relevant literatures are canvassed to critically assess what we know-and what we do not know-about deliberation's effects. Finally, the instrumental benefits of deliberation are recast in light of the ongoing systemic turn in deliberative theory. This article adds to our theoretical understanding of deliberation's promises and pitfalls, and helps practitioners identify gaps in our knowledge concerning how deliberation works and what its wider societal implications might be.