Institutional checks and corruption: The effect of formal agenda access on governance

Heller, William B.; Kyriacou, Andreas P.; Roca‐Sagalés, Oriol

doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12155

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 75 publications

(111 reference statements)

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“…It covers the longest period of time and comes from a single source, which minimizes over-time variation in the meaning of the scale. Other studies have used the ICRG data as indicators of the quality of government, making the results of our analysis comparable with theirs (Knack 2001;Knack and Rahman 2007;Charron and Lapuente 2010;Fortunato and Panizza 2015;Sundell 2015;Heller et al 2016). We expected that the total number of IGO memberships held by each country would be negatively associated with the quality of government index.…”

Section: Dependent Variablessupporting

confidence: 51%

Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

2019

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We contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the joint influence of a country’s memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates consistent, unintended, disruptive effects, which reduces domestic accountability and can worsen the quality of a domestic government. Even if we assume that joining any particular IGO is beneficial for member states, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships could undermine the quality of their governments. Our comparative, cross-national empirical findings support this theoretical expectation. Countries participating in a larger number of IGOs tend to have poorer scores on five widely used indicators of the quality of a domestic government. Future research should identify the types of policies and countries where the negative externalities of international cooperation on domestic accountability are greatest.

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Section: Dependent Variablessupporting

confidence: 51%

Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

2019

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“…Institutional audits are increasingly recognized as an important tool in the fight against corruption. Heller et al (2016) argue that political systems are poorly designed for institutional audits. The study, however, has the limitation of looking only at legislative audits.…”

Section: Explain Corruption's Causes and Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kurum Kalitesi ve Yolsuzluk İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği

Çiçen

2023

Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi

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The relationship between the level of corruption and the quality of Turkey's institutional structure was investigated in this study. Using quarterly data between 1984-2015, RALS-ADF unit root and RALS-EG cointegration tests were used to determine if there is a relationship between these variables in Turkey. Corruption level is the dependent variable, institutional quality is the independent variable, and the total production index is the control variable. The first analysis included both the coalition and single-party periods. Also, a separate analysis was carried out for the coalition period 1984-2002. There was no correlation between corruption and institutional quality in either analysis.

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“…Over the last 35 years of democracy in Brazil, one party has been particularly important in this process, establishing the norms of political exchange and elaborating diverse stratagems for sharing power: the MDB. As Heller, Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2016) note, even on the "simple" issue of plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and district magnitude, scholars such as Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) and Chang and Golden (2006) come to differing conclusions about the impact on corruption.…”

Section: Figure 1 -Checks and Balances As A Mediating Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption

Ros

Taylor

2021

Rev. direito GV

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It is often assumed that checks and balances are effective in curbing corruption, in part because checks and balances are so often assumed to be synonymous with the separation of powers. We argue that checks and balances are only one of several potential manifestations of the separation of powers. We suggest that the apparent correlation between checks and balances and control of corruption is driven by a variety of conditions antecedent to both. Using examples from Western democracies, we demonstrate that the concept of checks and balances is by itself an empty vessel, made effective only by “hard” factors such as the balance of political forces and “soft” factors such as the adherence of elites to particular behavioral norms. This does not mean that checks and balances cannot be useful, but rather that our assumptions about their precise utility may be misinformed: the relationship between checks and balances and curbing corruption is at best indirect.

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Institutional checks and corruption: The effect of formal agenda access on governance

Cited by 9 publications

References 75 publications

Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

Kurum Kalitesi ve Yolsuzluk İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği

Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption

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