Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania

Robinson, Elizabeth; Albers, Heidi J.; Ngeleza, Guyslain K.; Lokina, Razack

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.08.004

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In Tanzania's Kibaha forest, villagers involved in the participatory forest management initiative have been encouraged to reduce the pressure on their forest in exchange for tree planting and beekeeping initiatives. Yet much of the pressure on this forest, located close to the main urban center of Dar es Salaam, comes from demand for charcoal in the city [23]. Villagers have found that enforcing their property right against outsiders is difficult even for experienced forest guards; village "insiders" are reluctant to engage in enforcement activities that lead to conflict and have limited legal standing within the forest.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Payments to individual village members can be influenced by, for example, the length of residency, age, and number of children in the household. However, the payment cannot be influenced by the cost imposed on an individual due to the REDD+ contract or the efforts that the individual makes towards achieving the REDD+ sequestration target [23].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, although households are likely to be affected differentially by the REDD+ pilot, paying equal individual dividends is a pragmatic approach to dealing with a situation in which much of the use of the forest before the implementation of REDD+ was de jure illegal. Second, all villagers have a similar monetary stake in protecting the forest in the future [23]. This approach focuses all stakeholders on a shared future rather than an imperfect past of de jure government forest rights that were rarely enforced with decades of technically illegal forest use by villagers.…”

Section: Redd+ Payments and Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The size of the payment to each village is based on detailed estimates of historical rates, actual rates of deforestation with REDD+, and predicted future rates without REDD+ [23]. Thus, at the village level, efforts have been made to ensure a clear link between the payment and the reduction in forest loss.…”

Section: Redd+ Payments and Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Experience with such institutions may reflect a tacit assumption that "social fencing"-a sense of collective responsibility to protect a commonly held and used resource-is sufficient to protect the REDD+ forests [23,[26][27][28][29][30]. Social fencing may ensure compliance by influencing "insiders" to adhere to village-level regulations [23].…”

Section: Enforcement and Links To Pressures On The Forestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Allocating Group-Level Payments for Ecosystem Services: Experiences from a REDD+ Pilot in Tanzania

et al. 2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD+-Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation-is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD+ occurs when it is implemented at a group, rather than an individual landowner, level. Whilst achieving a group-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to a defined group as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how REDD+ has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania with the village defining the group. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid towards monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV), and equity. No explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the village-level PES, and few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by individual group members or by outsiders. However, the development of village-level institutions, "social fencing," and a shared future through equal REDD+ payments, factor into decisions that influence the level of compliance at the village level that the program will eventually achieve.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Redd+ Payments and Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Redd+ Payments and Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%