Information Disclosure Model Under Supply Chain Competition with Asymmetric Demand Disruption

Abstract

This paper develops the game models of two symmetric supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, while both retailers compete in the market with a linear function. The disclosure mechanism is designed when the information of the disrupted demand is asymmetric between supply side and retail side. We first study the model with the full information as a benchmark to explore the effect of asymmetric information on the system. In the case, each manufacturer maximizes her profit while the downstream retailer only obtains the reservation profit. For the case of asymmetric information, each manufacturer can obtain the real information of the disrupted demand by using a menu of contract bundles. For each information structure, there are always robust regions for each manufacturer’s original trading quantity scheme. That is, when the disrupted amount of the demand is sufficiently small, the trading quantity will be unchanged. However, some special measures, e.g., the higher unit wholesale price, should be taken to prevent the retailer from deviating the trading quantity scheme. The high-disruption retailer gets the higher profit due to the information rent. Compared with a single supply chain, Cournot competition results in the less retail price and the lower performance for the whole system.

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