Influences and vulnerabilities in radicalised lone-actor terrorists

Abstract

The threat to national security from terrorists acting on their own initiative is a challenge for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the UK and elsewhere. The UK Parliament’s 2014 threat assessment noted ‘a trend towards ‘low signature’ terrorism by small, self-directed groups and lone actors’ [House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2014) Counter-Terrorism – Seventeenth Report of Session 2013–14]. Lone actors have become a higher priority for counter-terrorism professionals (UK police, Prevent practitioners and security agencies), but there is a paucity of research into the views and awareness of these professionals. This qualitative study examined how Prevent practitioners perceived the radicalisation and motivations of lone-actor terrorists they had encountered. Participants were an opportunity sample of five Prevent practitioners; all had served as police officers with varying employment backgrounds and counter-terrorism experience. A thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews identified perceived general characteristics of lone-actor radicalisation. Three themes clustering around the concept of becoming a terrorist are discussed: mechanisms of radicalisation, vulnerability to radical discourse, and individual motivation. Participants construed radicalisation as a process over time, accelerated in the presence of generalised criminality or extensive Internet use. Vulnerability was seen as inherent, as well as a product of social context. Participants adopted folk-psychological explanations with mental health problems, social isolation and relative deprivation cited as prominent vulnerability factors. Lone actors were seen as motivated by grievances (e.g. deprivation), pressure from external sources (e.g. rational prospectors) or personal reward (e.g. sensation-seeking). Practitioners’ perceptions of the process over time had parallels with a diathesis–stress model, although there was some support for social movement theory.

Subjectivity in detection of radicalisation and violent extremism: a youth worker's perspective

“…In the case of the youth workers, it has been shown that these perspectives are mainly formed from individual know-how and personal development based on individual life experiences. In practice, there is an insufficient methodological perspective on extremism for youth workers to rely on (Mattsson, 2017;Peddell et al, 2016). Therefore, implementing CVE-policy takes place on the basis of a mix of facts, norms, values and personal feelings.…”

“…Despite trainers' attempts to give insight into the complexity of the issue, the first studies show that in practice it is not possible to monitor and detect extremism and/or radicalisation methodically (Mattsson, 2017;Peddell et al, 2016). Knowledge about the monitoring and detection of extremism and radicalisation can therefore only be imparted to a limited extent.…”

“…talk about "radicalisation" and "violent extremism"), does not help the informants make sense of their mission' (p. 16). Another qualitative study done by Peddell, Eyre, McManus, and Bonworth (2016) emphasises heavily on the uncertainties that practitioners express when performing their duties. They point out how practitioner's perceived influences and vulnerabilities in radicalised lone-actor terrorists.…”

The multifinality of vulnerability indicators in lone-actor terrorism

“…This conflation, nevertheless, is pervasive. In reporting the findings of a series of interviews with Prevent practitioners, Peddell, Eyre, McManus, and Bonworth (2016) illustrate the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the notion of 'vulnerability': "Broadly, individuals were characterised as vulnerable because of a personal characteristic that rendered them unable to resist radical discourse, or the influence of the social context in which they lived, or both. All participants viewed mental health issues as a significant factor in personal vulnerability" (p. 68).…”

Early detection of extremism? The local security professional on assessment of potential threats posed by youth

“…When a front-line professional operates preventively in the area between social welfare and early-detection of violent extremism, his/her judgment is particularly unstructured and not entirely objective. Such was the outcome of the few studies about early detection that have been conducted among front-line practitioners so far (e.g., Aly, Balbi & Jacques [15]; [16][17][18][19]). This outcome seemed to stem from a lack in the necessary development of knowledge that has taken place among local security experts, in the inconsistent use of concepts such as radicalization and (violent) extremism, and in doubts about the ability to accurately assess potential risk at such a level.…”