Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?

Bruttel, Lisa; Kamecke, Ulrich

doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6

Cited by 36 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…That some first movers cooperate after meeting a defecting second mover is consistent with subjects using strategies that are more forgiving than the well-known grim-trigger and tit-for-tat strategies. Such strategies can induce higher levels of cooperation if players are prone to making mistakes (for further evidence see Bruttel and Kamecke 2011;Fudenberg et al 2011). 23 The reason unconditional cooperation appears in Fig.…”

Section: Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 The strategies observed in these studies can be the result of both strategic and non-strategic cooperators, and therefore, these papers cannot differentiate between the two motivations. Muller et al (2008), Bruttel and Kamecke (2011), and Cabral et al (2011 are the closest related studies. Muller et al (2008) report an experiment where subjects play a two-period linear public good game in which they can condition their contribution in the second period on the total contribution of others in the first period.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The result is that strategic behavior has a more pronounced effect than learning in explaining the endgame effect. Bruttel and Kamecke (2011) have participants play a prisoner's dilemma game three times in a row and then, for the remaining periods of the repeated game, submit conditional choices depending on the four potential outcomes in the previous period. They find that such short-memory strategies account for a large share of actual decisions in the indefinitely-repeated game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our method adds another component, which is the identification of strategically-and nonstrategically-motivated cooperation. In particular, in Muller et al (2008) and Bruttel and Kamecke (2011), choices within each period are simultaneous and therefore affected by expectations. For example, even when contributions in the previous period are high, subjects who are conditional cooperators would still defect in the current period if they believe others will defect in the current period (after cooperating strategically in the previous period).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Reuben

Suetens

2011

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategicallyand non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.

show abstract

Section: Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Reuben

Suetens

2011

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This confirms the end-game effect found above. The negative time trend observed in Result 3 can be confirmed only for 9 Each of these treatments was played twice. The second round of repeated games was not announced and was conducted as a "surprise restart".…”

Section: Treatments With a Shorter Horizonmentioning

confidence: 79%

The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

Normann

Wallace

2011

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force.

show abstract

An experimental study of the interaction effects of incentive compensation, career ambition, and task attention on Chinese managers' strategic risk behaviors

Chng

Wang

2015

J Organ Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Building on the person-pay interaction model, we developed and tested a model for the influence of managers' career ambition and task attention on their responses to incentive compensation under different conditions of firm performance. We argued that managers with greater career ambition and task attention will be more responsive to incentive compensation, thereby engaging in more strategic risk behaviors, such as strategic risk taking and strategic change. Results of our experiment using a managerial decision-making game with a sample of Chinese managers partially supported this contingency perspective. Under the condition of performance decline, managers' career ambition only accentuated the positive relationship between incentive compensation and strategic change. By contrast, task attention strengthened the positive relationships between incentive compensation and both strategic risk taking and strategic change. However, under the condition of performance growth, neither managers' career ambition nor their task attention influenced their responses to incentive compensation. We discuss the implications for how organizational leaders can use incentive compensation to influence the strategic risk behaviors of managers.

show abstract

Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?

Cited by 36 publications

References 14 publications

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

An experimental study of the interaction effects of incentive compensation, career ambition, and task attention on Chinese managers' strategic risk behaviors

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About