Infants at Risk for Schizophrenia: Sequelae of a Genetic Neurointegrative Defect

Fish, Barbara; Marcus, Joseph; Hans, Sydney L.; Auerbach, Judith G.; Perdue, Sondra T.

doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1992.01820030053007

Cited by 337 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…12,13 Multiple reports indicate the presence of premorbid neurologic soft signs in children who later develop schizophrenia. [14][15][16] Slight posturing of hands and transient choreoathetoid movements have been observed during the first 2 years of life in children who later developed schizophrenia. 15,17 Additionally, poor performance on tests of attention and neuromotor performance, mood and social impairment, and excessive anxiety have been reported to occur more frequently in high-risk children with a schizophrenic parent.…”

Section: The Neurodevelopmental Theory Of Schizophrenia and Supportivmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, Revisited

Fatemi

Folsom²

2009

Schizophrenia Bulletin

689

449

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While multiple theories have been put forth regarding the origin of schizophrenia, by far the vast majority of evidence points to the neurodevelopmental model in which developmental insults as early as late first or early second trimester lead to the activation of pathologic neural circuits during adolescence or young adulthood leading to the emergence of positive or negative symptoms. In this report, we examine the evidence from brain pathology (enlargement of the cerebroventricular system, changes in gray and white matters, and abnormal laminar organization), genetics (changes in the normal expression of proteins that are involved in early migration of neurons and glia, cell proliferation, axonal outgrowth, synaptogenesis, and apoptosis), environmental factors (increased frequency of obstetric complications and increased rates of schizophrenic births due to prenatal viral or bacterial infections), and gene-environmental interactions (a disproportionate number of schizophrenia candidate genes are regulated by hypoxia, microdeletions and microduplications, the overrepresentation of pathogen-related genes among schizophrenia candidate genes) in support of the neurodevelopmental model. We relate the neurodevelopmental model to a number of findings about schizophrenia. Finally, we also examine alternate explanations of the origin of schizophrenia including the neurodegenerative model.

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Section: The Neurodevelopmental Theory Of Schizophrenia and Supportivmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, Revisited

Fatemi

Folsom²

2009

Schizophrenia Bulletin

689

449

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…There is much evidence, however, that abnormalities are evidenced at a very early age in people who go on to meet DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia in adolescence or adulthood. For example, children born to mothers with schizophrenia demonstrate abnormalities in infancy, which has been called a pandysmaturation syndrome (Fish 1977;Fish et al 1992). High-risk children also demonstrate cognitive and social functioning deficits in childhood and early adolescence (Erlenmeyer-Kimling 2000;Neumann 1995).…”

Section: R3 Analogies Between Schizophrenia and Autismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chaotic itinerancy is a key to mental diversity

Tsuda

2004

Behav Brain Sci

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Abstract:The relevance of chaotic itinerancy and other types of exotic dynamical behavior described by Tsuda (2001) certainly goes beyond the scope of his target article. These concepts of dynamics may offer a general framework for the understanding of complexity, which could help to restructure the analysis and conceptualization of mental states in novel ways, providing insights for the philosophy of mind.Most philosophical treatments of the classical concepts of cognition (such as volition, consciousness, intentionality, mental content, rationality) seem to be trapped in an unsafe argument that, by and large, goes like this: There are two opposing alternatives, naturalism and anti-naturalism, both with unwanted consequences. It is generally accepted that to be a naturalist is to be a physicalist and/or functionalist and to believe in the computational mind and/or physical (computational) brain. To be a antinaturalist is (as Dennett [1995] so aptly puts it in a somewhat different context) to play tennis with the net down. If one is a anti-naturalist, then one is free from the restrictions of science, and it is easy to justify any concept, from intrinsic intentionality to wonder tissue to qualia, without having to worry how these fit into a description of the universe as a whole. There are other points of view existing somewhere between these two extremes, such as double-aspect theories, where the physical and mental aspects of material are considered distinct, but the manner in which they are distinguished is not addressed. However, this again internalizes the naturalist/anti-naturalist dichotomy. So where do we stand? Currently, few people are completely comfortable with naturalism-cum-physicalism in a strict form; functionalism is on the defense; accepting the small wonders offered by anti-naturalism is not the approach of choice. Are there other options? Maybe there are.The above argument goes too fast. Several hidden assumptions underlie it, which together implicitly ensure a harmony of naturalism and reductionism (or eliminativism), or a unity of naturalism and computationalism. At least two of the assumptions are easy to identify. The first is that the mind is confined to a single level of phenomena (therefore, all mental events can be treated within a single explanatory scheme). The second is that mental states are homogeneous (therefore, they are all similar, constituting a natural kind).One kind of thing makes up the mind, and one functional theory explains how it works: cognitive science has traditionally held this. However, Ryle (1949), perhaps Haugeland (1995, and more recently van Gelder (1998) laid the groundwork for a fundamental challenge to the concept of a homogeneous mind. Their concern is with the difference between mind and cognition, but their idea that the mind is somehow not one thing is far more general. Van Gelder made a significant move when he combined this philosophical idea of ontological heterogeneity with low-level functional models to form what is known as the "dynamical hypot...

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“…The developmental hypothesis of schizophrenia came to the fore in modern times in the studies of Bender (1947), Bender and Freedman (1952), Fish (1957), O'Neal and Robins (1958) and Sobel (1961). Analyzing the postnatal psycho-motor and neuropsychological development of schizophrenics and of children genetically at risk for schizophrenia, these authors found that schizophrenics tended to show alterations in the norma} pattern of psycho-motor and intellectual development during the first years of life.…”

Section: Chronologymentioning

confidence: 99%