Chaotic itinerancy is a key to mental diversity

Abstract

Abstract:The relevance of chaotic itinerancy and other types of exotic dynamical behavior described by Tsuda (2001) certainly goes beyond the scope of his target article. These concepts of dynamics may offer a general framework for the understanding of complexity, which could help to restructure the analysis and conceptualization of mental states in novel ways, providing insights for the philosophy of mind.Most philosophical treatments of the classical concepts of cognition (such as volition, consciousness, intentionality, mental content, rationality) seem to be trapped in an unsafe argument that, by and large, goes like this: There are two opposing alternatives, naturalism and anti-naturalism, both with unwanted consequences. It is generally accepted that to be a naturalist is to be a physicalist and/or functionalist and to believe in the computational mind and/or physical (computational) brain. To be a antinaturalist is (as Dennett [1995] so aptly puts it in a somewhat different context) to play tennis with the net down. If one is a anti-naturalist, then one is free from the restrictions of science, and it is easy to justify any concept, from intrinsic intentionality to wonder tissue to qualia, without having to worry how these fit into a description of the universe as a whole. There are other points of view existing somewhere between these two extremes, such as double-aspect theories, where the physical and mental aspects of material are considered distinct, but the manner in which they are distinguished is not addressed. However, this again internalizes the naturalist/anti-naturalist dichotomy. So where do we stand? Currently, few people are completely comfortable with naturalism-cum-physicalism in a strict form; functionalism is on the defense; accepting the small wonders offered by anti-naturalism is not the approach of choice. Are there other options? Maybe there are.The above argument goes too fast. Several hidden assumptions underlie it, which together implicitly ensure a harmony of naturalism and reductionism (or eliminativism), or a unity of naturalism and computationalism. At least two of the assumptions are easy to identify. The first is that the mind is confined to a single level of phenomena (therefore, all mental events can be treated within a single explanatory scheme). The second is that mental states are homogeneous (therefore, they are all similar, constituting a natural kind).One kind of thing makes up the mind, and one functional theory explains how it works: cognitive science has traditionally held this. However, Ryle (1949), perhaps Haugeland (1995, and more recently van Gelder (1998) laid the groundwork for a fundamental challenge to the concept of a homogeneous mind. Their concern is with the difference between mind and cognition, but their idea that the mind is somehow not one thing is far more general. Van Gelder made a significant move when he combined this philosophical idea of ontological heterogeneity with low-level functional models to form what is known as the "dynamical hypot...