Inducements, contributions, and fulfillment in new employee psychological contracts

Abstract

This longitudinal study of newly hired Chinese college graduates (N ϭ 143) investigates the effects of contract fulfi llment, employee reports of company inducements (organizational support and job rewards), and supervisory reports of individual contributions (job performance and extra-role citizenship behavior) upon changes in the graduates' psychological contracts. Three survey waves were administered a year apart, starting with the recruits' job offer acceptance. Analyses revealed that employee fulfi llment and perceived contributions predicted particular changes in employer psychological contract obligations, whereas employer fulfi llment and perceived inducements predicted changes in employee obligations. The effects of inducements on employee obligation changes and contributions on employer obligation changes were mediated by their respective fulfi llment measures. Changes in obligations were greater in the fi rst year of employment than in the second. This study yields implications for managing newcomers and researching the initial phase of employment.

How societal culture influences friction in the employee–organization relationship

“…If several organizations start to offer a unique inducement to entice top employees, then other organizations are likely to follow suit, enabling organizations to compete for the best applicants, as well as allowing them to expect high levels of contributions from employees. This approach of 'paying' for the best and brightest performers is by its nature transactional (Lee, Liu, Rousseau, Hui, & Chen, 2011), albeit in an extensive form; an organization offers significant and widely varied inducements to potential employees to attract them, then expects employees to contribute at high levels in exchange for those inducements, allowing the organization to outperform competing firms. Thus, the essential characteristic of inducements representing an extensive transactional EOR strategy is that there are many of them, but compared to the other strategies, they emphasize individual merit.…”

“…In contrast, employees from both ingroup and institutional collectivist cultures contribute to the workplace by collaborating and cooperating with coworkers and direct supervisors, based on the motive to belong. Employees from both types of collectivist cultures are more likely to attempt to blend in with their fellow employees, over calling attention to their individual efforts (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007), and in-group collectivist employees may also be focused on anticipating and meeting the needs of their immediate supervisors (Lee, et al, 2011). Not only are these contributions inconsistent with the contributions expected of employees in individualist organizations, but it is also likely that organizations' performance and reward systems are not designed to capture these types of contributions.…”

“…Since most EOR research is based in Western societies that are also relatively individualist (Hui, et al, 2004b;Rousseau, 1995;Rousseau & Schalk, 2000), assumptions have developed within that context about which inducements typically represent transactional and relational strategies. Specifically, competitive pay and pay-for-performance are typically transactional, while a good relationship with a supervisor and collaborative work environment are typically relational inducements (Lee, et al, 2011). However, other inducements, such as opportunities for development, have the potential to be classified in either category, depending on the meaning imposed on them by societal members (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007;Lee, et al, 2011).…”

“…Specifically, competitive pay and pay-for-performance are typically transactional, while a good relationship with a supervisor and collaborative work environment are typically relational inducements (Lee, et al, 2011). However, other inducements, such as opportunities for development, have the potential to be classified in either category, depending on the meaning imposed on them by societal members (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007;Lee, et al, 2011). …”

“…There is a growing body of research on EORs in China (Hui, et al, 2004a;Hui, et al, 2004b;Lee, et al, 2011), but a dearth of EOR research in other in-group and institutional collectivist societies, making it difficult to distinguish between China-specific effects and those that are more generalizable. As proposed by this model, relational inducements in institutional and ingroup collectivist societies might look different than they do in the West, based on theoreticallygrounded dimensions that can be extrapolated beyond one country's borders.…”