Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time

Craver, Carl F.; Kwan, Donna; Steindam, Chloe; Rosenbaum, R. Shayna

doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.03.004

Cited by 73 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…'s performance on the TGT is also consistent with his performance on delay and probabilistic discounting tests in separate investigations of future decision making in the absence of episodic future imagining (reviewed in Craver, Kwan, Steindam, & Rosenbaum, 2014). These investigations were structured to dissociate the ability to construct coherent narratives from the ability to orient oneself in time, both of which are required in typical tests of autobiographical memory and future imagining (Kwan et al, 2012(Kwan et al, , 2013.…”

Section: Downloaded By [Central Michigan University] At 22:07 06 Octomentioning

confidence: 54%

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No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making

Rosenbaum

Kwan

Floden

et al. 2016

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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Does advantageous decision-making require one to explicitly remember the outcome of a series of past decisions or to imagine future personal consequences of one's choices? Findings that amnesic people with hippocampal damage cannot form a clear preference for advantageous decks over many learning trials on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) have been taken to suggest that complex decision-making on the IGT depends on declarative (episodic) memory and hippocampal integrity. Alternatively, impaired IGT performance in amnesic individuals could be secondary to risk-taking and/or impulsive behaviour resulting from impaired episodic future thinking (i.e. prospection) known to accompany amnesia. We tested this possibility in the amnesic individual K.C. using the IGT and the Toronto Gambling Task (TGT), a novel task that dissociates impulsivity from risk-taking without placing demands on declarative memory. K.C. did not develop a preference for advantageous over disadvantageous decks on the IGT and, instead, showed a slight preference for short-term gains and an inability to acquire a more adaptive appreciation of longer-term losses. He also did not display impulsive or risk-taking behaviour on the TGT, despite a profound inability to imagine personal future experiences. These findings suggest that impaired decision-making on the IGT in amnesia is unlikely to reflect a predilection to act in the moment or failure to take future consequences into account. Instead, some forms of future-regarding decision-making may be dissociable, with performance on tasks relying on declarative learning or on episodic-constructive processes more likely to be impaired.

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Section: Downloaded By [Central Michigan University] At 22:07 06 Octomentioning

confidence: 54%

“…He was right-handed and had 16 years of formal education. His case is welldocumented in the literature (e.g., Craver et al, 2014;Kwan et al, 2012;Rosenbaum et al, 2005Rosenbaum et al, , 2009 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 90%

No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making

Rosenbaum

Kwan

Floden

et al. 2016

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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“…I do certainly feel I often have something in memory that is at the same time stronger and more personal than a semantic fact and weaker than the full-blown episodic recall experience. I certainly don't feel that I am "living life in the third person" (Baycrest, 2015), or "stuck in time", and would concur with the view of Craver et al (2014) that more needs to be done to tease out exactly which aspects of temporal consciousness are affected by episodic deficits. It may be that part of the resolution of this puzzle lies in other models such as Paivio's DCT, and that my own consciousness is simply more verbal than visual.…”

Section: "I … Could Hold Very Accurate and Stable Visual Images In Mymentioning

confidence: 95%

(A)phantasia and SDAM: Scientific and Personal Perspectives

Watkins¹

2017

Preprint

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I address two interlinked aspects of the diversity in our experiences of memory and the mind's eye. I summarise the long-appreciated role of imagery in mathematics and the physical sciences, and contrast it with the evidence that some scientists have had limited or zero imagery. I then recount the story of how I became aware of my own lack of mental imagery, and the accompanying deficit in my episodic memory, how I have sought scientific understanding of these conditions, and how they have affected my life.

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“…This caused to some misunderstanding. In a recent work, for example, Craver et al (2014, p. 192) argued that La Corte et al (2011) and Dalla Barba and La Corte’s (2013) concept of TC is ambiguous, because in their definition TC “comprises many cognitive faculties, including many that are preserved in people with severe deficit in episodic memory and future thought.” TC definition was probably not sufficiently clear in Dalla Barba and La Corte (2013). In the MCTT (Dalla Barba, 2002) and in other works from Dalla Barba’s group, TC is meant to refer to individuals’ phenomenological experience of remembering their past, of being present to their present world, and to predict episodes in their future.…”

Section: Comparison With Other Models Of Memory and Confabulation Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

A neurophenomenological model for the role of the hippocampus in temporal consciousness. Evidence from confabulation

Barba

Corte

2015

Front. Behav. Neurosci.

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Confabulation, the production of statements or actions that are unintentionally incongruous to the subject’s history, background, present and future situation, is a rather infrequent disorder with different aetiologies and anatomical lesions. Although they may differ in many ways, confabulations show major similarities. Their content, with some minor exceptions, is plausible and therefore indistinguishable from true memories, unless one is familiar with the patient’s history, background, present and future situation. They extend through the whole individuals’ temporality, including their past, present and future. Accordingly, we have proposed that rather than a mere memory disorder; confabulation reflects a distortion of Temporal Consciousness (TC), i.e., a specific form of consciousness that allows individuals to locate objects and events according to their subjective temporality. Another feature that confabulators share is that, regardless of their lesion’s location, they all have a relatively preserved hippocampus (Hip), at least unilaterally. In this article, we review data showing differences and similarities among forms of confabulation. We then describe a model showing that the hippocampus is crucial both for the normal functioning of TC and as the generator of confabulations, and that different types of confabulation can be traced back to a distortion of TC resulting from damage or disconnection of brain areas directly or indirectly connected to the hippocampus. We conclude by comparing our model with other models of memory and confabulation.

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Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time

Cited by 73 publications

References 41 publications

No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making

No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making

(A)phantasia and SDAM: Scientific and Personal Perspectives

A neurophenomenological model for the role of the hippocampus in temporal consciousness. Evidence from confabulation

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