Indeterminacy: Deep but not Rock Bottom

Mariani, C.

doi:10.1111/phib.12215

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(49 reference statements)

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“…First, it could be contended that in order to ground the determinate properties of the parts, the fundamental entity need not have determinate properties. Here, we cannot enter a detailed discussion of fundamentality and indeterminacy (for a recent discussion, see [23]). We just note that the burden of proof would in this case be on the monist, who should explain how determinateness can emerge (albeit in a local and perspectival manner) from what is fundamentally indeterminate.…”

Section: Why Rqm Is Incompatible With Priority Monismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Contrary to (i), we suggest that RQM should be interpreted, as coherentism requires, in terms of physical systems being (at least in certain cases) mutually dependent on each other, hence not giving rise to a pyramidal hierarchy, but rather to the ontological counterpart of a Quinean web of belief, each belief/entity being interdependent with some other. 23 As for (ii), we take it that 'Hume's Dictum', according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct fundamental entities, is also straightforwardly falsified by RQM. On the one hand, at least some of the physical systems described by quantum theory are arguably fundamental.…”

Section: Rqm Metaphysical Coherentism and Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Ontology for Relational Quantum Mechanics?

Dorato

Morganti

2022

Found Phys

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In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.

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Section: Why Rqm Is Incompatible With Priority Monismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Rqm Metaphysical Coherentism and Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Ontology for Relational Quantum Mechanics?

Dorato

Morganti

2022

Found Phys

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“…And if this is possible, then arguably the source of the indeterminacy should in some sense be located in the inter‐level relation between the relevant states of affairs. In recent papers it has been argued that, under very plausible assumptions, this is not particularly problematic (Eva, 2018; Mariani, 2020). The core idea in these works is that in order to argue that the inter‐level relation does not allow for derivative indeterminacy, we would either need to assume that the relation itself is fundamental, or that the relation is such to preserve determinacy from one level to another (as assumed by Barnes, 2014, in the context of the meta‐level approach to MI).…”

Section: Metaphysical Indeterminacy Needs Not Be Fundamentalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergent quantum indeterminacy

Mariani

2021

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Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

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“…3Barnes (2014, sec. 1) offers an argument that all metaphysical indeterminacies imply some fundamental indeterminacy, which has been debatable(Eva 2018;Mariani forthcoming). This paper does not take a stand in this debate.…”

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confidence: 95%

From indeterminacy in a fundamental theory to fundamental indeterminacy?

Lee

2023

Philosophical Books

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In this paper, I examine a case for fundamental indeterminacy (FI) by Elizabeth Barnes and offer my counterarguments. Barnes' account of FI includes both the characterization of FI and why we need to accept it. I argue that her reasons for accepting FI can be challenged even when we accept her characterization of FI. Her main claim is that finding a fundamental proposition that our fundamental theory is indeterminate about (FPF) gives us a reason to accept FI in metaphysics. I challenge her claim by pointing out more plausible options to address FPFs. An FPF may either indicate that the theory is nonfundamental or lead us to accept the antirealist view; there is no room for FI in either option. One may insist on accepting FI, but I argue that it is not theoretically rewarding enough. Hence, Barnes' case for FI can be contested.

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Indeterminacy: Deep but not Rock Bottom

Cited by 8 publications

References 32 publications

What Ontology for Relational Quantum Mechanics?

What Ontology for Relational Quantum Mechanics?

Emergent quantum indeterminacy

From indeterminacy in a fundamental theory to fundamental indeterminacy?

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